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“Facts prove that if corruption is allowed to spread, it will eventual-
ly lead to the destruction of a party and the fall of a government. . . . 
Serious violations of Party discipline and state laws that have oc-
curred inside our Party during the past few years are of a vile nature 
and have produced shockingly harmful political consequences. . . . 
All violations of Party discipline and state laws must be punished 
without exception, and we shall not be soft in dealing with them.”
XI Jinping, November 20121
 1.  “Study, Disseminate and Implement the Guiding Principles of the 18th CPC National 
Congress,” in Xi Jinping, The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 
pp. 17-18.   
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“When I grow up, I want to be . . . a corrupt official, because corrupt 
officials have a lot of things.”
 A six-year old schoolgirl in Guangzhou, September 20092
“It’s hard to be a good person in China. The system makes you numb 
to what’s right and wrong. Companies bribe each other, passing on 
the cost to customers, and use payoffs to cut corners, accelerate 
growth or box out competitors.”
 TAO Jun, an activist and former general manager of an Internet company 
in Foshan, China, December 20083
“There’s not a single straight road in China; they were all built with 
kickbacks. No one stays clean when traveling along these sparkling, 
yet tainted roads. Corruption is the norm, it has become the unwrit-
ten law, an article of faith. It is everywhere. . . . No one can stay 
clean. . . . Good luck to the person who tries to stay clean. . . . Not a 
single person in China can completely break free from corruption, 
and not a single road is straight.”
 XUECUN Murong, May 20124
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Three Anti (Sanfan) and the Five Anti (Wufan) Campaigns 
were initiated in 1951-1952 by MAO Zedong to curb corruption by the 
“tigers” or corrupt senior officials and businessmen respectively.5  On the 
other hand, the Anti-Corruption Campaign of 1963-1966 focused on pet-
ty corruption by targeting the “fleas” or lower-rank officials. At a high-
level meeting on these anti-corruption campaigns, Mao coined these 
terms when he asserted that: “the more graft cases that are exposed, the 
happier I am. Have you ever caught fleas on your body? The more you 
catch, the more pleased you are.”6
 2.  Primary school students were asked by the Southern Metropolis Daily in Guangzhou 
what they wanted to be when they grew up. See Joshua Keating, “I want to be a corrupt offi-
cial when I grow up!” Foreign Policy, September 10, 2009.  
 3.  Quoted in Mark Magnier, “Bribery and graft taint every facet of life in China,” Los 
Angeles Times, December 29, 2008. 
 4.  Murong Xuecun, “No roads are straight here,” New York Times, May 8, 2012. 
 5.  These two campaigns are discussed in Section V.B below.  
 6.  Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 119. 
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Sixty-three years later, the problem of corruption in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has not only remained unresolved but has be-
come an intractable and “maddingly resilient”7 problem. This poses a se-
rious threat to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as 
reflected in the first quotation above by XI Jinping during the first group 
study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CCP Central Committee 
on November 17, 2012.  The second quotation by the six-year old prima-
ry schoolgirl in Guangzhou brazenly admitting her ambition to be a cor-
rupt official when she grows up reflects not only the Chinese popula-
tion’s tolerance for corrupt officials but also their admiration for the
latter’s lavish lifestyle. Corruption is so widespread in China today that 
LING Jiefeng, a historical fiction writer, has observed recently that chil-
dren learn how to bribe teachers from an early age.  For example, a child 
attending kindergarten would inform his teacher that “my father works at 
a coal company. Please let me know if you are short of coal.”8 The third 
and fourth quotations by TAO Jun and XUECUN Murong confirm that 
corruption is “a way of life” in contemporary China. This means that cor-
ruption is rampant, occurring at all levels; thus making it the norm rather 
than the exception.9
After becoming the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the 18th Party Congress in 
November 2012, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign to eliminate 
the “tigers and flies” who had become rich through bribery and patron-
age.10  This campaign has been described by Anthony Saich of Harvard 
University as the “most ambitious anti-corruption campaign since at least 
Mao’s days.” Georgia State University’s Andrew Wedeman calls it the 
“most sustained drive against high-level corruption” following  the eco-
nomic reforms of the early 1980s.11
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) of 2012, China was ranked 80th among 176 countries with a 
score of 39/100. China’s performance did not improve significantly in 
 7.  Robert Lawrence Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s
Past, Current and Future Leaders, revised edition (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons [Asia], 
2011), p. 180. 
 8.  Nectar Gan, “Kindergarten corruption: Chinese author says even young children are 
crooked,” South China Morning Post, March 12, 2015.  
 9.  This useful distinction was introduced by Gerald E. Caiden in his article, “Public
Maladministration and Bureaucratic Corruption,” Hong Kong Journal of Public Administra-
tion, 3 (1) (June 1981): 58-62. 
 10.  Matt Schiavenza, “Why Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is hollow, unserious, 
and ultimately doomed,” The Atlantic, July 18, 2013. 
 11.  Quoted in Shai Oster, “President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign biggest since Mao,”
Bloomberg Businessweek, March 4, 2014. 
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2013 as it was ranked 80th among 177 countries with a score of 40/100.12
However, China’s ranking on the CPI dropped significantly from 80th to 
100th position in 2014 with a decrease in its score from 40 to 36.13 Chi-
na’s unfavorable performance on the 2014 CPI was criticized by the 
Global Times. The paper stated that the “20-place fall in ranking, which 
does not in the slightest reflect how terrified China’s corrupt officials are 
due to the anti-graft campaign, is barefaced mendacity.”14
Notwithstanding the Global Times’ criticism of China’s ranking on 
the 2014 CPI as an “incredibly irresponsible ranking, which was made 
through questionable working methods,”15 is China’s significant decline 
in its CPI ranking and score from 2012 to 2014 a reflection that Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign is ineffective and not reaping the expected results?  
This monograph addresses this question by evaluating the effectiveness 
of Xi’s campaign during its first 28 months from my perspective as a 
public administration scholar who has studied anti-corruption strategies 
in many Asian countries for 38 years. My evaluation identifies the 
strengths and weaknesses in Xi’s campaign and makes policy recom-
mendations for enhancing the effectiveness of China’s anti-corruption
strategy.16
This monograph is divided into seven sections. Following this in-
troductory section, the second section provides a background analysis of 
 12.  Details of China’s performance on the CPI from 1995-2014 are available at 
http://www.transparency.org.  
 13.  See http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results for the CPI 2014 ranking and scores 
for 175 countries. 
 14.  See “Corruption index reflects West’s prejudice,” Global Times, December 5, 2014. 
 15.  Ibid. 
 16.  See Jon S.T. Quah, “Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Compara-
tive Analysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 13 (1) 
(March 1982): 153-177; Jon S.T. Quah, “Singapore’s Experience in Curbing Corruption,” in 
Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine (Eds.), Political Corruption: 
A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), Chapter 48, pp. 841-853; 
Jon S.T. Quah, “Controlling Corruption in City-States: A Comparative Study of Hong Kong 
and Singapore,” Crime, Law and Social Change, 22 (1995): 391-414; Jon S.T. Quah, “Re-
sponses to Corruption in Asian Societies,” in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston 
(Eds.), Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), Chapter 28, pp. 513-532; Jon S.T. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asia: A 
Comparative Study of Six Countries (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003); Jon S.T. 
Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (Bingley: Emerald 
Group Publishing, 2011); Jon S.T. Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is this an Impossi-
ble Dream? (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Maryland, 2013); Jon S.T. 
Quah, “Combating Corruption in Asian Countries: What Lessons have we Learnt?” Public
Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal, 16 (1) (Spring 2013): 15-34; and Jon S.T. 
Quah, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five Asian Countries,”
Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1) (January 2015): 143-159. 
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the chronic problem of corruption in China since the CCP assumed pow-
er in October 1949 after the Kuomintang (KMT) government’s defeat 
and escape to the island of Taiwan. The third section focuses on XI 
Jinping and analyzes his family background and education, and explains 
his rise to power within the CCP so as to understand his objectives in ini-
tiating the anti-corruption campaign after assuming power. Before de-
scribing and evaluating Xi’s anti-corruption campaign in sections five 
and six, it is necessary to provide background information in the fourth 
section on the four anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), which constitute the 
other important component of China’s anti-corruption strategy. The con-
cluding section identifies the weaknesses of Xi’s anti-corruption cam-
paign and provides some suggestions for enhancing anti-corruption ef-
forts in China. Indeed, China will not succeed in curbing the systemic 
problem of corruption if it continues to rely on ineffective ACAs and im-
plement anti-corruption campaigns which target political opponents ra-
ther than address the underlying causes of corruption. 
II. ANALYZING CHINA’S SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION 
PROBLEM 
A. Corruption and the Dynastic Cycle 
The various dynasties in China from the Shang Dynasty (1600 to 
1000 B.C.) to the Ch’ing or Qing Dynasty (A.D. 1644 to 1911) were 
plagued with corruption, which was also an important contributing factor 
to their decline.  The periodic rise and fall of China’s rulers and dynas-
ties, described as the dynastic cycle, can be attributed to these four caus-
es: “oppressive land taxes, especially those imposed on peasants; an in-
crease in government corruption; inadequate protection of the people; 
and the inability of the regime to provide for the people in times of dis-
tress.”17  There were five stages in the dynastic cycle: “(1) the establish-
ment of a new virtuous and benevolent ruler; (2) a period of intellectual 
rejuvenation; (3) an era of corruption and misrule; (4) the occurrence of 
uncontrolled natural calamities, such as floods and/or droughts; and fi-
nally, (5) overthrow of the regime by rebellion or invasions.”18
YE Feng, the Director-General of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), one of China’s four ACAs, 
blames rampant corruption for the fall of many dynasties. According to 
 17.  Elizabeth Freund Larus, Politics and Society in Contemporary China (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), p. 16. 
 18.  James C.F. Wang, Comparative Asian Politics: Power, Policy, and Change (Eng-
lewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1994), p. 19. 
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Ye, “the founding emperors created the empire out of hardship and 
through hard work, but their descendants lost the empire because of cor-
ruption.” Consequently, many anti-corruption measures were initiated to 
curb corruption in China.  But “throughout history, they failed more of-
ten than succeeded in the fight against corruption, and no dynasty ever 
escaped the cycle of rise and fall which was linked to the phenomenon of 
corruption.”19
In short, an important historical trend in China was the dynastic cy-
cle in which corruption was a major cause for the decline and overthrow 
of the various dynasties. While China’s current political leaders wish to 
distance themselves from China’s imperial past, Carolyn Hsu argues that 
these aspects of corruption discourse in late imperial China – namely, 
“the moral mandate of the ruling regime, the power of the corruption 
charge, and the different degrees of acceptable and unacceptable fubai
[corruption]” – resonate and “live on” in China today.20  Orville Schell 
reminded us recently that the CCP leaders are concerned with combating 
corruption because of their “deep and frightening historical awareness” 
of “how dynasties and the Kuomintang fell due to uncontrolled corrup-
tion.”21
B. Corruption and Low Salaries of Officials in Imperial China 
In 59 B.C., Emperor Hsuan (73 to 48 B.C.) issued an edict to in-
crease by 50 percent the salaries of minor officials ranking 100 shih or 
less so as to prevent them from becoming corrupt. Emperor Ch’eng fol-
lowed suit in 7 B.C. by raising the salaries of officials ranking 300 shih
or less in 7 B.C.22 The “unrealistically low salaries” of public officials in 
11th century China was a major cause of the corruption of the lower level 
bureaucrats. The low salaries of the junior officials of the Song Dynasty 
(A.D. 960 to 1279) were increased during the early years, but the situa-
tion deteriorated by the middle of the 11th century because of the in-
creased growth of the bureaucracy and the fact that the officials were on-
 19.  Ye Feng, “The Chinese Procuratorate and the Anti-Corruption Campaigns in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China,” in Jianfu Chen, Yuwen Li and Jan Michiel Otto (Eds.), Implementa-
tion of Law in the People’s Republic of China (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 
pp. 113-114. 
 20.  Carolyn L. Hsu, Corruption and Morality in the People’s Republic of China (Bloom-
ington, IN: Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern 
China, No. 8, Spring 1996), p. 11.  
 21.  Quoted in “How serious is Xi Jinping in tackling corruption in China?” The Atlantic, 
June 28, 2013.  
 22.  Hans Bielenstein, The Bureaucracy of Han Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), p. 125. 
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ly paid for three  out of the six or seven years of service. Consequently, 
these officials were forced to supplement their income by engaging in 
private trade, which “led easily and too frequently to the misappropria-
tion of state property and the abuse of official position through venality 
and improbity of other kinds.”23
The low salaries of civil servants constituted a major cause of the 
corruption during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and Ch’ing or Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1911). Since three-quarters of government revenue dur-
ing the Ming Dynasty came from the land tax, the reduction in tax reve-
nues resulted in a drastic reduction in the salaries of civil servants. In 
1392, the salary schedule of civil servants was introduced, but by the 15th
century their salaries continued to decline in value because half of their 
salaries were paid in grain, and the other half in such commodities as silk 
fabrics, cotton cloth, pepper and sapanwood. In 1432, some officials 
were paid with confiscated garments and salvaged materials, and by 
1472, peas were also used as payment. By the mid-1440s, half of the sal-
aries of officials were unpaid.24
Pierre-Etienne Will has attributed the corruption in late imperial 
China to “insufficient salaries” and “loyalty to one’s family, ancestors, 
and native place.”25  The nominal salaries of the officials were woefully 
inadequate to meet their nine types of public and private expenses.26
Apart from unavoidable expenses such as family upkeep and employing 
private secretaries and servants, officials were also expected to contribute 
to charities or public works for political expediency, and to provide gifts 
and entertainment to their superiors to enhance their prospects for pro-
 23.  E.A. Kracke, Jr., Civil Service in Early Sung China: 960-1067 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1953), p. 83.  
 24.  Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van, High Corruption Income in Ming and Qing China 
(Columbia, MO: Department of Economics, University of Missouri, Working Paper 503, Feb-
ruary 2005), pp. 4-5. 
 25.  Pierre-Etienne Will, “Officials and Money in Late Imperial China: State Finances, 
Private Expectations, and the Problem of Corruption in a Changing Environment,” in Emman-
uel Kreike and William Chester Jordan (Eds.), Corrupt Histories (Rochester, NY: University 
of Rochester Press, 2004), pp. 52-53.  
 26.  The six public expenses of the officials were: (1) travel expenses to reach their posts 
after appointment at the capital, and later on special missions; (2) repayment of debts incurred 
at the capital before reaching their posts; (3) salaries of private staff; (4) contributions to chari-
ties, grants of start-up money for local projects; (5) “reciprocities” (yingchou), for meeting so-
cial obligations, delivering customary gifts to their superiors, and entertaining visiting col-
leagues, especially superiors; and (6) meeting the demands for funding and fees from the 
higher echelons, either customary or extortionary. The officials’ private expenses were: (1) 
living expenses and upkeep of family and servants in their posts and at home; (2) extra money 
representing “savings” for their retirement; and (3) demands from relatives at home for com-
mon expenses and charities. Ibid., p. 32.  
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motion.  Since the local officials could not meet their public and private 
expenses with their salaries, they were compelled to engage in corrupt 
activities. Consequently, the Yongzheng emperor introduced the “integri-
ty-nourishing” (yanglian) allowance in 1723, which multiplied their 
basic salaries by 10, 20 or more times, in order to help the local officials 
survive and perform their duties without resorting to alternative sources 
of revenue.27
C. Corruption during the Republican Period (1912-1949) 
After the Japanese troops surrendered in Tientsin on October 6, 
1945, the officials of the Chungking government reasserted control over 
areas held by the Japanese by taking over the property and assets of the 
Japanese and their collaborators. However, the takeover process became 
“a racket with official position treated as an opportunity rather than a re-
sponsibility” because the supervisors were “favorites, relatives, or close 
political allies of the Generalissimo.”28  Corruption was widespread be-
cause the government failed to provide “any equitable and orderly means 
for disposing of enemy property,” and the absence of institutional safe-
guards resulted in “the path to corruption” since there was no “overall 
plan or coordinated policy delineating what was to be taken over by 
whom.”29
Since corruption prevailed in China during the Republican period, 
“it was common for individuals to take advantage of their official posi-
tion first to occupy a building and then to manipulate things in such a 
way as to have the building sold to them.”30  An investigating committee 
found that “offenders down to the soldiers [were] using the resources of 
the country as their personal property.” The KMT officials believed that 
“as public functionaries they had suffered so much hardship and priva-
tion in the interior during the seven years of war that they had a right to 
indulge themselves.”31 Consequently, “the web of corruption that had 
spread through Nationalist China eroded the [KMT] regime’s ability to 
defend itself.”32
 27.  Ibid., pp. 31 and 34. 
 28.  Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle 
for Postwar Asia (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 58-59. 
 29.  Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 16-17. 
 30.  Spector, In the Ruins of Empire, p. 59. 
 31.  Ibid., p. 60. 
 32.  Keith Maguire, “Modernization and Clean Government: Tackling Crime, Corruption 
and Organized Crime in Modern Taiwan,” Crime, Law and Social Change, 28 (1) (1997): 76. 
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The civil service was ineffective since the low salaries made the 
junior officials vulnerable to corruption. In 1934, CHIANG Kai-shek 
launched the New Life Movement in order to encourage the promotion 
of more traditional moral virtues, and “to fight against entrenched atti-
tudes of graft and corruption.”33 However, in June 1945, the KMT was 
plagued by factional struggles, corruption and low morale.34 The bureau-
cracy during the Republican period was “permeated with corruption” be-
cause there was “a wilful perversion of formal laws and procedures by 
the holders of public office for the sole purpose of their own and their 
families’ private gain – from the center down to the lowest pao and chia
official.”35
The rampant corruption in mainland China under CHIANG Kai-
shek’s government was a major reason for the KMT’s defeat by the CCP 
in October 1949. Keith Maguire has highlighted the significant differ-
ences in the level of corruption between the CCP controlled and KMT 
controlled areas. The Communists in the red base areas paid for the food 
they took and were polite and friendly to the peasants. However, looting 
was widespread in the KMT areas since their troops were poorly paid 
and had low morale. Consequently, the population favored the Com-
munists and “had no particular sympathy for the KMT.”36
In analyzing the CCP’s victory over the KMT, James E. Sheridan 
observed that unlike the excellent Communist leadership, the incompe-
tent and corrupt KMT generals stole and sold government property, 
sometimes to the Communists.37 The morale of the KMT’s army was “at 
rock bottom” because their soldiers were “inadequately paid and fed; 
training was poor to non-existent; discipline was bad; the rank and file 
did not know what they were fighting for, and thus, saw no reason to 
fight.” By contrast, there was high morale among the Communist sol-
diers because they were “well cared for, well trained, [and] thoroughly 
indoctrinated about the need and purpose of the struggle.”38 Finally, the 
Communists were also favored by the peasants because they “instituted 
honest government” and initiated political and economic reforms that 
benefited the peasants.39
 33.  Keith Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), p. 23. 
 34.  Ibid., p. 32. 
 35.  Pepper, Civil War in China, p. 147. The local administrative unit, chia, consists of 6 
to 15 families, and a pao comprises 6 to 15 chia (p. xi). 
 36.  Maguire, The Rise of Modern Taiwan, p. 29. 
 37.  James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History 
1912-1949 (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 272. 
 38.  Ibid., p. 273. 
 39.  Ibid., p. 274. 
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D. Corruption in China after 1949 
Most China watchers agree that corruption in China during the past 
65 years can be divided into two phases: Mao’s era, from 1949 to 1976 
and the post-Mao era, after the introduction of DENG Xiaoping’s “open 
door” policy in 1978.40 While the CCP’s aversion towards corruption
was responsible for its victory over the corrupt KMT government in Oc-
tober 1949, MAO Zedong was concerned that corruption would be the 
most serious problem facing the CCP because it had inherited the KMT’s 
administrative apparatus and its “deeply entrenched bureaucratism.”41 In 
1950, the CCP, alarmed at the corrupt behavior of veteran cadres, repri-
manded them for their lavish lifestyles and engaging in corrupt behavior 
such as “extramarital affairs, divorcing wives of peasant backgrounds to 
marry young, educated urban girls, and sexual harassment.”  In Beijing, 
79 veteran cadres (12 percent) were among the 650 persons involved in 
corruption during 1949-1951. In contrast, the problem was more serious 
in Shanghai as 319 CCP members had committed graft in 1950.42
While corruption was a problem in China during the 27 years under 
Mao, its magnitude pales in comparison to the exponential growth of cor-
ruption cases during the post-Mao era. Based on the amount of bribes in-
volved, the scale of corruption has increased exponentially from 100,000 
yuan per case in the late 1970s to millions of yuan per case in the late 
1990s.43 Deng’s “open door” policy gave rise to many corrupt practices 
and rampant smuggling in Fujian, Zheijiang and Guangdong provinces. 
The number of corruption cases in China increased in the early 1980s, 
continued to grow in the 1980s and 1990s, and involved both larger sums 
of money and more senior officials too.44
By analyzing the data collected on the corruption cases investigated 
by the procuratorates in China from 1980-2000 from their yearbooks and 
other sources, Melanie Manion found that among the 736,473 cases in-
vestigated, there were 404,548 cases (55 percent) involving embezzle-
 40.  There is a wealth of literature on corruption in China after 1949. The most useful 
sources are: Lu, Cadres and Corruption; Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building 
Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004); Qingli Meng, Corruption in Transitional China: A 33-Year Study (Oisterwijk: 
Wolf Legal Publishers, 2013); Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Itha-
ca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); and Andrew Wedeman, Double Paradox: Rapid 
Growth and Rising Corruption in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
 41.  Wedeman, Double Paradox, p. 89. 
 42.  Lu, Cadres and Corruption, pp. 35-36. 
 43.  Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of 
Governance in China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 219. 
 44.  Manion, Corruption by Design, pp. 84-85. 
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ment of public assets, 207,153 cases (28 percent) of bribery, and 124,778 
cases (17 percent) of misuse of public funds.45 This means that the Chi-
nese procuratorates had investigated an average of 35,070 cases per year 
during these two decades. China’s economic environment after the im-
plementation of Deng’s “open door” policy in December 1978 was con-
ducive for the rapid growth of corruption because of “more opportuni-
ties, higher payoffs, weaker enforcement, and lower psychic costs for 
officials choosing to engage in corruption.”46 The five “most common 
and serious forms of corruption” during the post-Mao period were “bu-
reaucratic commerce, predatory exactions, corrupt exchanges, use of 
public funds as private capital, and illegal privatization of state enterprise 
assets.”47
III. XI JINPING’S CAREER AND RISE TO POLITICAL POWER 
A. Family Background and Education 
XI Jinping was born on June 15, 1953 in the north western province 
of Shaanxi. His father, XI Zhongxun, was a revolutionary hero who had 
faithfully served MAO Zedong, but was purged by him and publicly 
stripped of his positions and humiliated in 1962. In January 1969, when 
XI Jinping was 15 years old, he was sent to a small, remote mountain vil-
lage of Liangjiahe in Wenan township of Yanchuan county in Shaanxi 
Province for “re-education” as part of Mao’s “Down to the Countryside”
Movement. He was part of the group known as “the children of black 
gang” or heibang, referring to those who preferred capitalism to social-
ism.48 He lived in a cave house for the next seven years cutting hay, reap-
ing wheat and herding sheep as a member of a local work unit during the 
day, and reading “thick books in the dim light of kerosene lamps” at 
night. He worked hard and earned the respect of his older colleagues, 
who also admired his personal modesty and endurance.49
Consequently, in 1972 Xi became responsible for party-line educa-
tion at the age of 19. One year later, he was appointed party secretary of 
his production brigade. He initiated a biogas program for cooking to al-
leviate energy shortages and led his commune members in building dams 
 45.  Ibid., p. 88, Table 3.1. 
 46.  Ibid., p. 94. 
 47.  Ibid., p. 96. For a comprehensive analysis of these five forms of corruption, see ibid., 
pp. 97-110. 
 48.  Xi Jinping, Son of Yellow Earth, reproduced as an Appendix in Lance L.P. Gore, 
“Deciphering the two abrupt turns of the Xi Jinping regime,” EAI Background Brief, No. 890 
(Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, January 27, 2014), p. 15.   
 49.  Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, p. 413. 
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and fixing ditches. Xi was recommended to study at Tsinghua (or Qing-
hua) University in 1975 even though he had only a primary school edu-
cation50 and received a grand send-off by the whole village when he left 
for his studies. The seven years of hard rural village life in Shaanxi were 
responsible for his practical orientation and enabled him to retain “his 
common man’s touch.”51
Xi admitted that many of his “practical ideas stem from my life dur-
ing that period, which has influenced me every minute, even till today. 
To truly understand the common folk and society is the most fundamen-
tal thing.”52  He was also influenced by his family from an early age in 
“building comradeship with people around” him. His father taught him 
about solidarity and encouraged him to seek and forge unity with other 
people.53  The most important difficulty Xi had to overcome during his 
seven years of living in the countryside was changing his mindset by 
learning the “peasants’ honest and practical ways and their spirit of hard 
work.”54  Xi admitted that his “seven years of living in the countryside 
have benefited me tremendously” and enabled him to “forge deep bonds 
with the masses and laid the foundation for my growth and progress.”55
The first foreign leader that Xi met in Beijing in November 2007 af-
ter his promotion to the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) was the 
late LEE Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister from June 1959 to 
November 1990. Lee’s first impression of Xi was highly favorable as he 
described him as “a man of great breadth – what the Chinese call da qi,
as opposed to xiao qi.” Xi is also “not narrow-minded” and “thinks 
through a problem deeply and he does not want to show off his 
knowledge.” He has gravitas and considering his trials and tribulations in 
Shaanxi Province in 1969 as a young man “working his way slowly back 
up, never complaining, never grumbling,” Lee “would put him in the 
Nelson Mandela class of persons.”56
In short, Xi’s personality emphasizes “perseverance, restraint, cir-
cumspection, and [a] low-key profile.” Furthermore, his governance style 
is “down-to-earth, determined but shrewd in political maneuvering, never 
pushy but yet skilful.” During his first two years in office, Xi has consol-
 50.  Hsin-Chi Kuan, China under the New Leadership (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of 
Law, University of Maryland, 2013), p. 3. 
 51.  Kuhn, How China’s Leaders Think, p. 414. 
 52.  Quoted in ibid., p. 414. 
 53.  Xi, Son of Yellow Earth, p. 16. 
 54.  Ibid., p. 15. 
 55.  Ibid., p. 16. 
 56.  Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2013), 
p. 28. 
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idated his power by following the established rules and “through a deli-
cate struggle of side-lining skeptics and placing [his] supporters in im-
portant positions.”57 As a princeling, Xi is “less guarded” than HU Jintao 
and has “the space to act, communicate, and relate to people with a con-
fidence that comes from living a life in which power and resources natu-
rally flowed his way.” Xi has also “experienced both palace life and 
peasant toil” and according to his peers, Xi’s experience in Liangjiahe 
has given him “an earthy pragmatism that distinguishes him from Hu, 
who was raised on Communist Party ideology and spent his working life 
inside the party machine.”58
Xi studied Chemical Engineering at Tsinghua University in Beijing 
as a “Worker, Peasant, PLA [People’s Liberation Army]” student 
(gongnongbing xuesheng) and graduated in 1979 at the age of 26.59  Dur-
ing his four years at Tsinghua University, Xi focused on basic organic 
synthesis and was a classmate of CHEN Xi.60 As Xi completed junior 
middle school lessons and devoted most of his time on revolutionary ac-
tivities rather than attending classes, he encountered problems with 
mathematics, chemistry and physics, and began to show more interest in 
history and literature.61 LIU Cuiquin, Xi’s former teacher at Tsinghua, 
said that he was hard working, excelled in sports, and “had a lovely heart 
and was respectful and caring to the teachers and other students.”62
After his graduation in 1979, Xi did not keep in touch with his alma
mater and classmates until the 1990s, when Tsinghua University became 
a “pilgrimage place” for politicians and CHEN Xi was the Secretary of 
the CCP Tsinghua University Committee.63  As the Governor of Fujian 
Province, Xi began his study for a Doctor of Law degree in Marxist The-
ory and Ideological and Political Education at the School of Humanities 
and Social Sciences (SHSS) at Tsinghua University. He wrote his doc-
toral dissertation on “Research on the Rural Marketization of China” un-
der the supervision of LIU Meixun, the Director of the Institute of Eco-
nomics at SHSS at Tsinghua University. He received his doctorate in 
 57.  Kuan, China under the New Leadership, p. 4. 
 58.  John Garnaut, “The Creation Myth of Xi Jinping: What do we really know about Chi-
na’s new leader?” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2012. 
 59.  Joseph Fewsmith, “China’s Ruling Elite: The Politburo and Central Committee,” in 
Larry Wortzel and Andrew Scobell (Eds.), Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutions, 
and Ideas after the 16th National Party Congress (Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Company, 
2004), p. 87. 
 60. Wu Ming, China’s Future: A Biography of Xi Jinping (Hong Kong: CNHK Publica-
tions Ltd., 2012), p. 68.  
 61.  Ibid., p. 71. 
 62.  Quoted in ibid., p. 72. 
 63.  Ibid., pp. 68 and 88. 
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2002 but questions were raised by critics on how he was able to get a 
doctorate without a master’s degree, without attending classes in Beijing 
when he was based in Fuzhou, and how he was able to write his disserta-
tion in spite of his busy schedule as the Governor of Fujian Province.64
However, his doctoral dissertation was revised and published later by the 
People’s Publishing House and was favorably reviewed by LU Liangshu, 
former Dean of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, and by 
HAN Juan, Director of the Department of Research on Rural Economy 
of the Development Research Center of the State Council.65










Department Period in 
Qinghua
University 
CHEN Yuan Shanghai 1945 1975 Automatic Control 1964-1970 
HU Jintao Anhui 1942 1964 Water Conservancy 1959-1965 
HUA Jianmin Jiangsu 1940 1961 Power 1957-1963 
LIU Yandong Jiangsu 1945 1964 Chemical Engineering 1964-1970 
LOU Jiwei Beijing 1950 1973 Computer Science 1978-1982 
TIAN   
Chengping 
Hebei 1945 1964 Civil Architecture 1962-1968 
WU Bangguo Anhui 1941 1964 Radio Electronics 1960-1967 
XI Jinping Shaanxi 1953 1974 Chemical Engineering 1975-1979 
ZHOU Ji Shanghai 1946 NA Precision Instruments 1964-1970 
ZHOU    
Xiaochuan 
Jiangsu 1948 1986 Economic            
Management 
1980-1985 
Source: Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing, 2010), p. 138, Table 4.2. 
The “Qinghua Clique” has declined from 20 members in the 16th
Central Committee to 10 members in the 17th Central Committee because 
of retirement.66 Table 1 provides details of the Qinghua Clique in the 17th
Central Committee and shows that Xi is the youngest member from 
Shaanxi Province and one of the two chemical engineering graduates. 
Apart from being a Qinghua graduate, Xi is among the 52 members of 
the 17th Central Committee with PhD degrees.67 As mentioned earlier, he 
also studied Marxist philosophy in an on-the-job postgraduate program at 
 64.  Ibid., pp. 88-91. 
 65.  Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
 66.   Bo Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing, 2010), p. 137. 
 67.  Ibid., p. 56. 
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Tsinghua University’s SHSS from 1998 to 2002 and obtained a Doctor 
of Law (LLD) degree in 2002 at the age of 48.68
As his father, XI Zhongxun, was a vice premier of the State Council 
from April 1959 to October 1962 and a key ally of DENG Xiaoping, XI 
Jinping is also one of the 25 “princelings” (taizidang or children of for-
mer senior CCP officials) in the 17th Central Committee.69  Table 2 iden-
tifies the nine members of the 17th PSC in October 2007. It should be 
noted that Xi is the only PSC member who is one of the six members of 
the 17th Secretariat.70
Table 2: The 17th Politburo Standing Committee (October 2007) 




Prior Party      
Position
Membership 
HU Jintao 1942 65 Anhui 16th PSC member Old 
WU Bangguo 1941 66 Anhui 16th PSC member Old 
WEN Jiabao 1942 65 Tianjin 16th PSC member Old 
JIA Qinglin 1940 67 Hebei 16th PSC member Old 
LI Changchun 1944 63 Liaoning 16th PSC member Old 
XI Jinping 1953 54 Shaanxi Shanghai Party 
Secretary 
New 
LI Keqiang 1955 52 Anhui Liaoning Party 
Secretary 
New 





1942 65 Jiangsu 16th Politburo 
member
New 
Source: Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 21, Table 1.1. 
B.  Administrative and Political Experience 
XI Jinping and LI Keqiang were promoted to the 17th PSC in Octo-
ber 2007 as candidates of the fifth generation leadership in China. Xi was 
transferred to Zheijiang as acting governor on October 12, 2002, after 
serving as acting governor and governor of Fujian from August 1999 to 
October 2002. He was promoted to Party Secretary of Zheijiang on No-
 68.  Zheng Yongnian and Chen Gang, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” Chi-
na: An International Journal, 7 (1) (March 2009): 24, fn. 51 and 30. 
 69.  Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 140, Table 4.3. 
 70.  Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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vember 21, 2002, and transferred to Shanghai as Party Secretary in 
March 2007 to replace HAN Zheng, the acting Party Secretary.71  Table 
3 provides details of the various positions held by Xi from 1979-2012. 
Table 3: Positions held by Xi Jinping, 1979-2013 
No. Period Position
1 1979-1982 Secretary of the General Offices of the State Council and     
Central Military Commission 
2 1982 Secretary to GENG Biao 
3 1982-1983 Deputy Party Secretary, Zhengding County, Hebei Province 
4 1983-1985 Party Secretary and First Political Commissar, Chinese People’s
Armed Police Force, Zhengding County, Hebei Province 
5 1985-1988 Executive Vice-Mayor of Xiamen and Member of Party City 
Committee and Standing Committee, Xiamen, Fujian Province 
6 1988-1990 Party Secretary, Prefectural Committee, Ningde Prefecture and 
First Secretary, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Nanjing  
Military Region, Fujian Military District, Fujian Province 
7 1990-1995 Chairman, City People’s Congress, Fuzhou, Fujian Province 
8 1990-1996 First Secretary, PLA, Nanjing Military Region, Fujian Military 
District, and Party Secretary, City Committee, Fuzhou, Fujian 
Province
9 1992-1997 Delegate, 14th Party National Congress 
10 1995-2002 Deputy Party Secretary, Provincial Committee, Fujian Province 
11 1996-2000 First Political Commissioner, PLA, Services and Arms, Reserve 
Artillery Division, Fujian Province 
12 1997-2002 Alternate Member, 15th Party Central Committee 
13 1998-2003 Deputy, 9th National People’s Congress 
14 1998-2002 Graduate Student, Humanities Department,                         
Tsinghua University, Beijing 
15 1999-2002 Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization Committee,  
Provincial Level, Fujian Province 
16 1999-2003 Deputy Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization       
Committee, City Level, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province 
17 1999-2000 Acting Governor, People’s Government, Fujian Province 
18 2000-2002 Governor, People’s Government, Fujian Province 
19 2001-2002 Member, Party Provincial Committee and Standing Committee, 
Fujian Province 
20 2002-2003 Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization Committee,  
Provincial Level, Zheijiang Province 
21 2002-2007 First Secretary, PLA, Regions, Nanjing Military Region, Zhei-
jiang Military District, Party Committee, Zheijiang Province 
22 2002 Deputy Party Secretary, Provincial Committee,                     
Zheijiang Province 
23 2002-2003 Acting Governor, People’s Government, Zheijiang Province 
24 2002-2007 Party Secretary, Provincial Committee, Zheijiang Province 
25 2002-2007 Member, 16th Party Central Committee 
 71.  Ibid., p. 23. 
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26 2003-2007 Chairman, Provincial People’s Congress and Standing       
Committee, Zheijiang Province 
27 March
2007 
Party Secretary, Municipal Committee, Shanghai Municipality 
28 2007-2012 President, Party Central Committee, Central Party School 
29 2007-2012 Member, 17th Party Central Committee Politburo, Standing 
Committee and Secretariat 
30 2007-2012 Vice-Chairman, 17th Party Central Committee, Taiwan Affairs 
Leading Small Group and Chairman, 17th Party Central     
Committee Party Building Leading Small Group 
31 2008-2013 Vice-President, People’s Government, People’s Republic of 
China 
32 2010-2012 Vice-Chairman, 17th Party Central Committee, Central Military 
Commission
33 2010-2013 Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission, PRC 
34 November 
2012
Secretary-General, 18th Party National Congress, General Secre-
tary, 18th Party Central Committee and Member,                     
18th Party Central Committee Central Military Commission, 
Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee 
Source: Compiled from China Vitae at 
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Xi_Jinping/full (accessed 18 March 2015). 
Xi’s promotion to the 17th PSC was based on “careful selection and 
deliberation.” A survey of a random sample of 400 senior officials by the 
Central Organization Department was conducted in January 2007 to as-
certain their views on social issues and to collect public opinion on can-
didates for the position of Shanghai Party Secretary. Xi performed well 
on this poll and was appointed to the position two months later.72 Contra-
ry to expectations, Xi’s appointment as Shanghai Party Secretary in 
March 2007 did not prevent him from being promoted to the 17th PSC. 
He was promoted because of his selection by 400 officials surveyed on 
June 25, 2007 to identify candidates for the 17th PSC from a pool of 200 
candidates below 63 years old with the rank of a minister or a chief mili-
tary region officer. LI Keqiang was HU Jintao’s protégé but Xi was 
placed ahead of Li because of his higher score on the survey. Xi’s posi-
tion as the heir apparent to Hu was consolidated in March 2008 with his 
election as the Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).73
Xi was not appointed as the first Vice-Chairman of the CMC in October 
2007 because he needed more time before becoming involved in military 
affairs.74
 72.  Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
 73.  Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
 74.  Ibid., p. 43. 
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C. Explaining Xi’s Meteoric Rise to Power
In his autobiography, Son of Yellow Earth, Xi revealed that he had 
submitted eight applications to join the Communist Youth League before 
he was accepted. Similarly, he was only admitted into the CCP in 1974 
and made the brigade party secretary only after submitting his tenth ap-
plication for membership because his previous nine applications were re-
jected due to his family background and based on the fact that his father 
XI Zhongxun was purged by Mao during the Cultural Revolution.75
After graduating with a degree in Chemical Engineering from 
Tsinghua University in 1979, Xi’s first position was Secretary of the 
General Offices of the State Council and CMC. In October 2007, 28 
years later, Xi was appointed as one of the nine members of the 17th PSC. 
In other words, Xi was promoted to the 17th PSC as a member of China’s 
fifth generation leadership 33 years after joining the CCP in 1974. Dur-
ing 1982-2013, Xi has held 17 positions, with an average of less than two 
years in each position. Xi’s fast-track career is the result of his “mastery 
of the political tricks necessary to move forward in good and opportune 
times.”76
What are the reasons for Xi’s rapid rise to political power from 
1974 to his appointment as the CCP’s General Secretary in November 
2012? First, Xi’s background as a princeling was not a disadvantage be-
cause during his seven years of hardship living in the Shaanxi country-
side Xi acquired the ability to relate with the masses. His wealth of grass-
roots experience put him in good standing and gave Xi the edge over his 
closest competitor, LI Keqiang, who lacked such experience.77 Zheng 
and Chen contend that Xi’s “abundant local grass-roots working experi-
ence” in northern Hebei, southeastern Fujian, eastern Zheijiang, and 
Shanghai from 1982 to 2007 was an important asset because in contrast 
Li remained in Beijing until he was transferred in 1998 from the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League to Henan Province 
to serve as the Deputy Party Secretary.78
Second, Xi’s strong ties with the military constituted an important 
asset for his climb to the top. His father’s “closest old comrade-in-arms” 
was GENG Biao, who was appointed as the Secretary General of the 
CMC in January 1979. He was also a Politburo member from August 
1977 and a Vice-Premier of the State Council from March 1978. 
 75. Xi, Son of Yellow Earth, p. 18.  
 76.  Kuan, China under the New Leadership, p. 4. 
 77.  For details of Li’s background, see Wu Ming and Lin Zheng, China’s Road: A Biog-
raphy of Li Keqiang (Hong Kong: CNHK Publications, 2012). 
 78.  Zheng and Chen, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” 10. 
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Through his father’s friendship with Geng, Xi was offered the position of 
Geng’s personal secretary in the CMC’s General Office. As Geng’s per-
sonal secretary, Xi was a member of Geng’s government delegation 
when they visited Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden in May 1979, 
and he also accompanied Geng and his military delegation to the United 
States from May 25 to June 6, 1980.79 Xi left his position at the CMC’s 
General Office in July 1981 when GENG Biao was succeeded by YANG 
Shangkun as the CMC’s Secretary General.80
Table 3 shows that Xi’s ties with the PLA are further reflected in his 
occupancy of these positions: First Secretary, PLA, Nanjing Military Re-
gion in Fujian Province (1988-1996); First Political Commissioner, PLA, 
Services and Arms, Reserve Artillery Division, Fujian Province (1996-
2000); Director, PLA, National Defense Mobilization Committee 
(NDMC), Provincial Level, Fujian Province (1999-2002); Deputy Direc-
tor, PLA, NDMC, City Level, Nanjing, Jiangsu Province (1999-2003); 
Director, PLA, NDMC, Provincial Level, Zheijiang Province (2002-
2003); and First Secretary, PLA, Regions, Nanjing Military Region, 
Zheijiang Military District, Party Committee, Zheijiang Province (2002-
2007).
Xi’s close ties with the PLA are cemented by the support he has re-
ceived from the CMC’s Vice-Chairmen, General GUO Boxiong and 
General XU Caihou,81 both of whom were loyal to former President 
JIANG Zemin, who was the CMC’s Chairman from November 1989 to 
September 2004. They have demonstrated their support for Xi on many 
occasions since his appointment as the CMC’s Vice-Chairman in Octo-
ber 2010.82 Xi’s other source of military support comes from these three 
“princeling generals”: General LIU Yuan (son of LIU Shaoqi), General 
LIU Yanzhou (son of LIU Jiande), and General ZHANG Haiyang (son of 
General ZHANG Zhen). As a close friend of Xi in the PLA, General LIU 
Yuan is also committed to fighting corruption.83
Third, Xi has valuable administrative experience as Governor of Fu-
jian Province (2000-2002) and Acting Governor of Zheijiang Province 
(2002-2003). More importantly, he has also risen rapidly within the CCP 
 79.  Bo Zhiyue, “Xi Jinping and his Military Ties,” EAI Background Brief, No. 702 (Sin-
gapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, March 1, 2012), p. 3.
 80.  Ibid., p. 4. 
 81.  General Xu, former vice-chairman of the CMC, was expelled from the CCP in June 
2014 and handed over to the prosecutors in October 2014 on corruption charges. See Liu Sha, 
“No one untouchable after downfall of Zhou Yongkang: PLA paper,” Global Times, December
18, 2014. 
 82.  Bo, “Xi Jinping and his Military Ties,” pp. 4-5. 
 83.  Ibid., pp. 6-9. 
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as can be seen from his various positions as Party Secretary in Zhengding 
County, Hebei Province (1983-1985); Party Secretary in Ningde Prefec-
ture, Fujian Province (1988-1990); Delegate at the 14th Party National 
Congress (1992-1997); Party Secretary in Fuzhou, Fujian Province 
(1990-1996); Alternate Member of the 15th Party Central Committee 
(1997-2002); Deputy of 9th National People’s Congress (1998-2003);
Party Secretary, Provincial Committee, Zheijiang Province (2002-2007); 
Member of 16th Party Central Committee (2002-2007); and Party Secre-
tary, Municipal Committee, Shanghai Municipality from March 2007 un-
til his promotion to the PSC in October 2007. 
The final reason for Xi’s rapid climb within the CCP hierarchy is
his incorruptible reputation and commitment to combating corruption 
within and outside the CCP. Xi’s performance in Fujian and Zheijiang 
Provinces facilitated his entry into the Political Bureau. Xi’s 17 years in 
Fujian Province first as Vice-Mayor of Xiamen in 1985 to later serving 
as  the Governor from 2000 to 2002 were significant because he was re-
sponsible for helping Fujian Province recover from the Yuanhua smug-
gling scandal.84  Similarly, Xi was moved in March 2007 to Shanghai to 
replace CHEN Liangyu, who was jailed for his role in the pension fund 
scandal, as Party Secretary. Xi’s clean reputation enabled him to clean up 
Shanghai by requiring its officials to declare their assets.85
When he was 35, Xi’s first attempt to combat corruption occurred 
after his appointment as the Party Secretary for the Ningde Prefecture in 
May 1988. Ningde was a poverty-stricken prefecture of 14,000 square 
kilometers with a population of about three million and a per capita in-
come of RMB160.86 Xi’s difficult task was to improve the poverty and 
poor infrastructure in Ningde Prefecture. The three major life events in 
East Fujian were building a house, funerals and weddings. Xi found that 
7,392 cadres had built private houses in the area since 1982, including 
242 cadres above vice county level and 1,399 cadres above section level. 
One cadre spent RMB100,000 to build a 300 square meters house, which 
was beyond his official income. Before Xi’s arrival, the Ningde Prefec-
tural Party Committee investigated this problem three times but without 
any positive results as the housing construction continued unabated.87
Xi began to curb the “roadside corruption” by demolishing the 
buildings and investigating and prosecuting those officials responsible 
for their construction. He restricted housing construction with “an iron 
 84.  Zheng and Chen, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” 11. 
 85.  Ibid., 12. 
 86.  Wu, China’s Future: A Biography of Xi Jinping, p. 178. 
 87.  Ibid., p. 190. 
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hand” and made inspection breakthroughs by “cracking the hard nut, at-
tacking the negative models, and demolishing the diehard.”88 Xi’s first 
anti-corruption campaign won public support in East Fujian and was en-
dorsed by ZHANG Mingqing, Head of the Fujian Journalist Station of 
the People’s Daily, who submitted a report titled “Investigating on Ca-
dres’ Violating Discipline to Build Houses in Ningde, Fujian” to the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council for Internal Reference. The re-
port was subsequently published as an article in the People’s Daily titled
“A good deed wins thousands of people”, which made Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign in Ningde famous.89
In sum, XI Jinping succeeded HU Jintao because of his acceptabil-
ity to the CCP’s various factions in view of “his special family back-
ground, unique personal experience and low-profile, open-minded char-
acteristics”90 as well as his strong ties with the military, extensive 
administrative and experience, and honest reputation. Xi’s “biggest re-
deeming quality is that he has managed to rise up the party hierarchy 
without creating major waves, getting caught up in any major scandals, 
or creating too many enemies.” Like Hu, Xi is “a good consensus candi-
date for party secretary, because although he is probably not anyone’s 
first choice, he is at least acceptable to a wide range of cadres.”91 Simi-
larly, Gordon Chang contends that Xi was selected because he “appealed 
to factions” as he was not identified with any faction, and was “essential-
ly, the least unacceptable candidate.”92 The event that confirmed Xi’s 
selection as Hu’s successor was his successful management of the Bei-
jing Olympic Games in August 2008, which was his first political test 
after his appointment as the PRC’s Vice-President in October 2007.93
Perhaps, the best explanation for Xi’s selection as Hu’s successor is 
provided by Kerry Brown, who attributes Xi’s success to his extensive 
membership of the five networks of family, military, business, provincial 
and elite support. Unlike his six colleagues in the 18th PSC, “the political
 88.  Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
 89.  Ibid., p. 191. 
 90.  Zheng and Chen, “Xi Jinping’s Rise and Political Implications,” 9. 
 91.  Melanie Hart, China’s Real Leadership Question (Washington, DC: Center for Amer-
ican Progress, August 16, 2012), p. 23. 
 92.  Gordon G. Chang, “China’s Next Mao,” Journal of International Security Affairs, 25
(Fall/Winter 2013): 7.
 93.  See Bo, China’s Elite Politics, p. 370 and Zheng Yongnian and Chen Gang “A Politi-
cal Gold Medal for Xi Jinping: The Successful Beijing Olympics,” EAI Background Brief, No. 
407 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, October 8, 2008), p. 1.
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rationale for Xi is that he alone combined the full range of networks.”94
Brown observes that Xi’s “diverse range of supportive networks” spread 
from “those he inherited from his father; to those he acquired while 
working in his military position; and then in the county, prefecture, pro-
vincial and national entities from 1979 onwards.” His eight years in Fu-
jian and Zheijiang Provinces and brief stay in Shanghai linked him to 
powerful local business interests and provincial political and social 
elites.95  Table 4 confirms that Xi is the only committee member belong-
ing to all the five networks, thus confirming his choice as Hu’s succes-
sor.
Table 4: Networks of Members of 18th Politburo Standing Committee 
Name Networks 
XI Jinping Family, military, business, provincial, elite support (5) 
LI Keqiang Family, provincial, business, some elite support (4) 
WANG Qishan Family (inherited), provincial (brief), business 
(central, intellectual), elite support (4) 
ZHANG Gaoli Provincial, elite support, business (3) 
ZHANG Dejiang Provincial, elite support, business (3) 
YU Zhengsheng Family, provincial, business, elite support (4) 
LIU Yunshan Business (intellectual, central), some elite support (2) 
Source: Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China  (Lon-
don: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 218.   
IV. CHINA’S RELIANCE ON MULTIPLE ANTI-CORRUPTION 
AGENCIES 
Unlike Singapore and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion (SAR), which rely on a single ACA like the Corrupt Practices In-
vestigation Bureau (CPIB) and the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) respectively,96 China relies instead on these four 
ACAs: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI); the 
Ministry of Supervision (MOS); the SPP; and the National Corruption 
Prevention Bureau (NCPB). 
 94.  Kerry Brown, The New Emperors: Power and the Princelings in China (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2014), p. 218. 
 95.  Ibid., p. 121. 
 96.  For details of these two ACAs, see Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, pp. 
221-232, 253-264. 
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A. Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 
The origins of the CCDI, which is the lead ACA in the PRC, can be 
traced to the creation of the CCP’s Discipline Supervision Commissions
(DSCs) at the central and provincial levels in April 1927 in order to 
strengthen its consistency and authority.97 In November 1949, the CCP’s 
Central Political Bureau established the Discipline Inspection Commis-
sions (DICs) at the central and local levels to conduct discipline inspec-
tions in all the departments directly under the central government and the 
CCP organizations at all levels. Consequently, the number of personnel 
in the DICs grew from less than 1,500 to 7,269 from April 1951 to De-
cember 1954.98 In 1953, the DICs dealt with 409,532 cases and initiated 
disciplinary measures against 74,671 CCP members.99  The DICs were 
replaced by the DSCs at the central and local levels in March 1955 to 
strengthen the CCP’s political and organizational discipline.100
The Cultural Revolution from May 1966 to October 1976 disman-
tled the CCP’s discipline inspection system and in April 1969, the DSCs
at all levels were abolished by the CCP’s 9th National Congress, thus 
halting the CCP’s discipline inspection work. After more than nine years 
in December 1978, the third session of the CCP’s 11th National Congress 
decided to re-establish the CCDI, which held its first plenary meeting on 
January 4, 1979.101 The CCDI’s 100 members were elected at the De-
cember 1978 meeting with CHEN Yun as its first secretary, which en-
hanced his career prospects in the CCP.102  The 12th Party Congress in 
1982 elected a new CCDI with 132 members, of whom only 26 had 
served on the previous CCDI.103  The number of CCDI personnel has in-
creased by almost eight times over the past 32 years and reached about 
1,000 by December 2014.104
 97.  Guo Yong, “Historical Evolvement and Future Reform of the China Communist Party 
Discipline Inspection Commission,” (Paper presented at the Opening Ceremony of the Centre 
of Anti-Corruption Studies and Seminar in Hong Kong, April 2, 2009), p. 236. 
 98.  Ibid., p. 236. 
 99.  Ting Gong, “The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its Evolving Trajectory and 
Embedded Dilemmas,” Crime, Law and Social Change, 49 (2) (March 2008): 142.  
 100.  Guo, “Historical Evolvement and Future Reform of the China Communist Party Dis-
cipline Inspection Commssion,” p. 236. 
 101.  Ibid., p. 237. 
 102.  Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power: Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Le-
gitimation Crisis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), p. 207. 
 103.  Graham Young, “Control and Style: Discipline Inspection Commissions since the 11th
Party Congress,” China Quarterly, 97 (1984): 30. 
 104.  Chen Gang, “Wang Qishan and China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspec-
tion,” EAI Background Brief, No. 1012 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University 
of Singapore, April 2, 2015), p. 10. 
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The CCDI reports to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and is 
supervised by the CCP’s Central Committee. The CCDI’s composition 
and its procedures are governed by the CCP’s Constitution and statutes, 
which entrusts the CCDI with the responsibility of coordinating the 
CCP’s anti-corruption activities by article 44.105 The CCDI’s role as the 
chief coordinator of the CCP’s anti-corruption efforts and the PRC’s lead 
ACA was recognized at the 16th Party Congress in 2002.106 In March 
2013, the CCDI’s organizational chart was revealed on the website of the 
MOS. The CCDI is divided into these nine offices: General Office; Gen-
eral Inspection Office; Corruption Prevention; Research; Legal Office; 
Communication and Education Office; Party Culture Construction Of-
fice; Inspection Circuit; and Correction of Unhealthy Tendencies within 
Organizations and Industries. These offices are assisted by eight Inspec-
tion Offices, which are further divided into these ten units: Law En-
forcement Inspection; Performance and Efficiency Management; Investi-
gation Surveillance Office; Prosecutor Office; Letters and Visits Office; 
Official Management Office; External Affairs Office; Internal Affairs 
Office; Party Commission; and Bureau of Retired Officials.107
The CCDI also publicizes on the same website these five steps for 
launching a corruption investigation: (1) receiving the report; (2) prelim-
inary probe; (3) launching the case; (4) investigation; and (5) transfer 
case to the police.108  The CCDI has revealed recently that it dispatches 
agents to meet fugitive corrupt officials in those countries like the United 
States, Canada and Australia, where China does not have extradition 
treaties, to persuade them to return home. Furthermore, it also provides 
other countries with evidence of criminal activity, including violations of 
that country’s immigration laws. China conducted Operation Fox Hunt in 
56 countries and by November 2014, 288 fugitives suspected of financial 
crimes were arrested by the CCDI.109
Since China’s ACAs employ a sectoral approach to investigate cor-
ruption cases, the CCDI and DICs only deal with party officials who are 
accused of corruption. Even though the CCDI is China’s lead ACA, it is 
 105.  Irene Hors, Gretta Fenner, Joachim Pohl and Janos Bertok, “Fighting Corruption in 
China,” in Governance in China (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, 2005), p. 117. 
 106.  Gong, “The Party Discipline Inspection in China,” 147. 
 107.  Lin Yunshi, “Graphics: Details of Party’s Discipline Watchdog released,” Caixin 
Online, March 14, 2013. The MOS website is available at http://www.mos.gov.cn. 
 108.  Ibid. 
 109.  Mark Hanrahan, “China anti-corruption campaign: Authorities reveal how they target 
fugitives in countries with no extradition treaties,” International Business Times, March 19, 
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not a statutory law supervision agency like the SPP but the CCP’s inter-
nal disciplinary agency responsible for investigating corruption involving 
party members.110
B. Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)
The SPP originated from the People’s Procuratorate, which was es-
tablished in 1949 to ensure that the government’s activities complied 
with the law and to investigate and prosecute serious crimes committed 
by public officials. However, it was the weakest of the four organization-
al monitors formed by the CCP because of the shortage of cadres and the 
fact that its primary function did not entail organizational supervision.111
The People’s Procuratorate “transacted very little actual business” and 
played “a minimal role” during its first two years.112 Its “virtually snail-
like pace” resulted from “the acute shortage of qualified personnel to 
man a comprehensive and balanced network of procuratorial offices.”113
Furthermore, the government did not initiate a training program to meet 
the shortage of competent cadres because it preferred to rely on “non-
judicial methods of suppression and punishment, bound by few rules” 
than on the People’s Procuratorate, which was hampered by procedural 
restrictions. Consequently, the People’s Procuratorate was “fated to oc-
cupy a back seat” while other agencies like the Office of Public Security, 
“enjoyed undisputed priority of precedence.”114
The SPP was re-established in 1978 to combat judicial corruption. 
The People’s Procuratorates are identified by article 129 of the PRC’s 
Constitution as the “state organs for legal supervision.” In 1989, the SPP 
created the Procuratorial Division of Graft and Bribery in the wake of the 
Tiananmen anti-corruption and democracy movement. The Bureau for 
Embezzlement and Bribery of the People’s Procuratorate handles and 
prevents cases of embezzlement and bribery by investigating economic 
crime including misappropriation of public funds, tax evasion and refusal 
to pay taxes, and use of fake trademarks.115 The SPP institutionalized its 
 110.  Guo, “Historical Evolvement and Future Reform of the China Communist Party Dis-
cipline Inspection Commssion,” p. 247. 
 111.  Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 78-79. 
 112.  George Ginsburgs and Arthur Stahnke, “The Genesis of the People’s Procuratorate in 
Communist China 1949-1951,” China Quarterly, 20 (October-December 1964): 21.  
 113.  Ibid., 22. 
 114.  Ibid., 23-24. 
 115.  Luo Ji, Miao Chunrui and Guo Hua (Eds.), The Work against Embezzlement and 
Bribery in the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China (Beijing: Procurato-
rial Department for Embezzlement and Bribery, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, n.d.), p. 3.  
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anti-corruption efforts in 1989 with the formation of the General Bureau 
of Anti-Corruption.116
In December 1995, the SPP established an Anti-Corruption and An-
ti-Bribery General Office and similar offices at the provincial level in 28 
provincial procuratorates and at the municipal level in nearly 300 munic-
ipal procuratorates. The SPP continued to build specialized anti-
corruption departments in the local procuratorates to enhance their ca-
pacity in corruption control in 1996.117 The SPP renamed its Department 
of Law and Regulation as the Department of Anti-Malfeasance of Duty 
in July 2000 to reflect these four new priorities: (1) malfeasance of duty 
of senior officials in the CCP and administrative sector; (2) judicial sec-
tor corruption; (3) administrative legal enforcement corruption; and (4) 
public sector employee corruption.118
On November 3, 2014, Xinhua reported that the SPP had formed a 
new anti-corruption committee to solve “unprecedentedly serious” cases 
of corruption. According to QIU Xueqiang, the Deputy Procurator-
General, since the SPP’s work has been weakened by “a frail organiza-
tional structure and staffing limitations,” the new agency “will be better 
organized” to help the SPP “handle major cases and break institutional 
obstacles.”119
C. Ministry of Supervision (MOS) 
In November 1949, the Central Supervision Commission was creat-
ed to investigate public accusations against state agencies and officials 
for malfeasance and other offenses. Local commissions were also estab-
lished in the provinces and counties. The Austerity Inspection Commis-
sion (AIC) was formed in December 1951 to implement the Three Anti 
Campaign. The expansion of the supervision apparatus led to the creation 
of 3,586 supervisory agencies with 18,000 supervisory officials and 
78,000 “people’s supervision correspondents.”120  The MOS was formed 
by the 1954 constitution, which empowered the supervisory agencies to 
supervise, investigate and recommend further disciplinary measures 
 116.  Stephen K. Ma, “The Dual Nature of Anti-Corruption Agencies in China,” Crime, 
Law and Social Change, 49 (2) (March 2008): 154. 
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against administrative misconduct by public officials.121 It was dissolved 
in 1959 but was restored by the Standing Committee of the 6th NPC in 
December 1986 to curb corruption in the civil service.122
The MOS is described as the “Ministry of Honesty in Foreign Con-
tracts” because it is responsible for checking “all contracts signed with 
foreign interests for any indications of ‘corruption’—from failure to pro-
vide for compensation within legal limits to undercover arrangements 
that amount to bribery.”123  It also investigates the problems encountered 
by the different departments of the State Council, the people’s govern-
ments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in fol-
lowing and enforcing discipline, laws, regulations and decisions of the 
people’s government. Its third function is to receive and investigate 
complaints about civil servants and personnel of state administrative de-
partments violating administrative procedures. The MOS’s final function 
is to accept and consider appeals by those civil servants and other state 
administrative personnel for not adhering to the punishment imposed for 
their mistakes.124
Both the CCDI and MOS have their counterparts at the provincial, 
municipal, and county levels.125  As most civil servants are also party 
members, the MOS and CCDI merged in January 1993 after working to-
gether for six years. However, both ACAs have retained their separate 
organizational identities, with the MOS being responsible for the control 
of administrative punishment in State Council organs and the CCDI fo-
cusing instead on the punishment of CCP members.126
D. National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) 
Unlike the CCDI, SPP and MOS, which focus on the investigation 
and prosecution of corruption offenses among public officials, the NCPB 
was formed on September 13, 2007 as China’s fourth ACA to implement 
preventive measures, monitor the transfer of assets across the organiza-
tions, facilitate and promote information sharing between agencies, and 
police corrupt practices among private enterprises, social organizations, 
 121.  Ibid., p. 65. 
 122.  Ma, “The Dual Nature of Anti-Corruption Agencies in China,” 154. 
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and nongovernmental organizations.127  Thus, the NCPB focuses on two 
aspects not dealt with by the other three ACAs namely, corruption pre-
vention and private sector corruption. 
The NCPB is located within the MOS and was headed by MA Wen, 
who was the Minister of Supervision, the CCDI deputy secretary and a 
Central Committee party member. It is divided into four offices with a 
coordinating office, and consists of 30 personnel drawn from the Minis-
try of Justice, the Supreme People’s Court and the SPP.128  The CCDI, 
MOS and SPP are ineffective ACAs because of “limited coordination be-
tween the three agencies, a lack of timely, actionable information, and 
narrow oversight capabilities all hinder anti-corruption work.”129 Conse-
quently, the NCPB cannot enhance coordination and facilitate coopera-
tion among the ACAs in China because apart from its limited independ-
ence and minimal enforcement capabilities, its creation has increased 
complexity instead of improving coordination. The NCPB is in “a highly 
untenable position” because it lacks the power to enforce its mandate of 
coordinating the work of the ACAs.130 Its creation was “symbolic” as it 
cannot investigate individual cases of corruption.131
E. Weaknesses of China’s ACAs
There is an unequal division of labor and power among the four 
ACAs in China with the lead ACA, the CCDI, being the most powerful 
and responsible for dealing with party officials accused of corruption of-
fenses. Those found guilty of disciplinary offenses, including corruption, 
are punished according to the severity of their offenses. Punishments can 
include  a warning, serious warning, demotion from duty, expulsion from 
the CCP with a two-year probation period, or expulsion from the CCP 
and transfer to the judicial system for those accused of accepting bribes 
exceeding 5,000 yuan.132
Flora Sapio has criticized the CCDI for protecting party cadres who 
are under investigation by shielding them in “a safe nest” and exempting 
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them from criminal punishment.133  This weakness of the CCDI is re-
flected in the low conviction rate of party members being investigated 
for misconduct. PEI Minxin found that only 1,915 (6.6 percent) of the 
28,901 cadres disciplined by the CCDI were sentenced by the courts.134
The CCP’s lenient treatment of its corrupt members can be attributed to 
the political tradition of not imposing the legal penalty for corrupt party 
members in order to save the “face” of the CCP and government and 
prevent the erosion of official authority. In other words, instead of pun-
ishing high-ranking officials, which is shameful and threatens the author-
ity of the CCP and government, the preferred option is to rely on “inter-
nal resolution.” Consequently, corrupt party officials believe that they 
would unlikely be caught or punished.135
Since not all officials who are suspected of corruption and investi-
gated in China are convicted, CAI Yongshun contends that some corrupt 
officials are punished less severely for three reasons. First, those corrupt 
officials who are cooperative, make voluntary confessions, provide in-
formation on the corruption of other officials, and return illegal income 
to the government, are punished less severely. Second, some corrupt of-
ficials receive less harsh punishment depending on the definition of the 
amount of money embezzled or bribes received. Third, when there are 
many corrupt officials, only seriously corrupt officials are punished 
whereas the less corrupt officials are exempted from punishment in order 
to avoid paralyzing the operations of the city or local government. In-
deed, “when the number of corrupt agents becomes too high, curbing 
corruption becomes too difficult, if not impossible.”136  The inconsisten-
cies in investigating and punishing corrupt officials at both the central 
and local levels in China have undermined the credibility of the discipli-
nary agencies and encouraged the belief among officials that they would 
unlikely be punished for corrupt offenses.137
The CCP’s preference for disciplining corrupt party members by re-
lying on the DICs instead of subjecting them to investigation and prose-
cution by the SPP has also contributed to their low conviction rate. Apart 
from replacing harsh criminal punishment with disciplinary action for 
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corrupt officials, the probability of establishing their guilt is very low due 
to the limited investigative skills and experience of the DIC personnel 
and the fact that it takes them nine months to complete their investiga-
tions.138  Corrupt officials can cover their tracks and destroy incriminat-
ing evidence to avoid punishment because of the DIC personnel’s poor 
investigative skills and inordinate delay in completing their investiga-
tions.139 In comparison to the DIC, the SPP has more personnel with a 
legal education background and are also more professional.140
During their formative years, the CCDI and DICs were inadequately 
staffed and their personnel’s lack of previous experience in control work 
was not supplemented by specialized training because of the emphasis on 
their moral qualities and adherence to party principles.141 Instead of ad-
dressing their personnel’s lack of skills in discipline inspection work, the 
DICs provided ideological and vocational training to enhance their un-
derstanding of party policies and increase their knowledge in several re-
lated fields.142
In additional to the limited capacity of the CCDI and DICs person-
nel, China’s ACAs are also not independent. The CCDI members are 
elected for five years by the CCP’s Central Committee. The MOS is a 
functional department of the State Council and its minister is nominated 
by the Premier and approved by the NPC or its standing committee. The 
budgets of the CCDI and MOS are also approved by the People’s con-
gresses at the same level.143  The personnel of the CCDI and DICs have 
faced “numerous difficulties” because of their limited operational auton-
omy from the CCP. The 1955 National Conference highlighted the DICs’ 
lack of autonomy but the 1956 Party Constitution reaffirmed their subor-
dination to the party committees.144 The DIC personnel are subject to the 
dual authority or leadership of the party committee at the corresponding 
hierarchical level, and higher-level control organs up to the CCDI and 
the Central Committee.145 In investigating those party members who 
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have violated party style, the DICs distinguish between “work mistakes, 
political mistakes, line mistakes, and counter-revolutionary actions” and 
rely on educating them on discipline and party style instead of punishing 
them.146
The SPP’s independence is compromised in practice by the power 
of the local party committee and local people’s government regarding the 
appointment, promotion, transfer or removal of procuratorial personnel 
and the funding of the procuratorates. A provincial procuratorate is equal 
in status and independent of the provincial people’s government accord-
ing to the Constitution, but in practice it is viewed as a subordinate part 
of the people’s government. The procuratorates are ineffective in super-
vising the legality of the work of the public security agencies and labor 
reform organizations as they cannot enforce their recommendations for 
rectifying the irregularities or impose sanctions for these irregularities. 
Finally, as most procurators are not well trained, a Central Procurators 
Management Academy was established in 1991 to enhance their train-
ing.147
The final limitation is the lack of coordination between the CCDI 
and the SPP. Since the MOS merged with the CCDI in 1993, there is lim-
ited coordination and cooperation between both agencies because of their 
unequal relationship. The CCDI and DICs have four advantages over the 
SPP in investigating corruption cases. The first advantage arises from the 
fact that since the DICs learn about the corruption cases first, they can 
investigate these cases before transferring them to the procuratorates. 
Second, the CCDI can appropriate criminal corruption cases involving 
party members by punishing them internally with disciplinary measures 
instead of transferring them to the SPP for prosecution and harsher pun-
ishment. The DICs’ third advantage is their broader jurisdiction, which 
enables them to investigate a broader range of misconduct than the proc-
uratorates. The final advantage arises from the larger number of DICs 
and their omnipresence at the grassroots level, in rural villages, urban 
neighborhoods, and within workplaces. As the procuratorates only oper-
ate at the county level, it is not surprising that the CCDI and DICs have 
received more reports of corruption than the procuratorates.148
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To minimize competition and enhance cooperation between the 
CCDI and SPP, both agencies agreed in 1988 to share information and 
transfer cases. In 1989, the CCDI, SPP, Supreme People’s Court and the 
Ministry of Public Security also agreed to share information and docu-
ments in the investigation of corruption cases. Furthermore, in 1993, the 
CCDI, SPP and MOS issued the “Circular to Strengthen Cooperation be-
tween the DICs and Procuratorates in Anti-Corruption” to promote coop-
eration by agreeing to meet regularly.149  However, in practice, given its 
status as the lead ACA and the CCP’s preference for disciplining corrupt 
party members internally, the CCDI and DICs investigate more corrup-
tion complaints involving party members than the SPP and the procurato-
rates.
V. XI JINPING’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN 
A. Mass Campaigns in China 
In his analysis of various anti-corruption measures, Leslie Holmes 
has identified anti-corruption campaigns as a popular measure for curb-
ing corruption in communist and post-communist states, including Bul-
garia, Czechia, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Russia and Ukraine (which 
had initiated anti-corruption campaigns during the 1990s).150 China has 
implemented the most anti-corruption campaigns151 and even though the 
former Soviet Union initiated many anti-corruption campaigns in the 
1980s, it “could not match the Chinese in terms of public campaigning 
by the leadership against corruption.”152
The extensive reliance on mass campaigns in China is also reflected 
in the literature. 153 Alan Liu has defined a “mass campaign” as “a series 
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of organized, planned actions for a particular purpose, usually involving 
the mobilization of a large number of people to engage in highly visible, 
intensive, and concentrated activities.”154  Unlike Liu, Charles Cell de-
fines a mass mobilization campaign as an “organized mobilization of col-
lective action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power rela-
tionships and/or economic institutions and productivity.”155 Finally, 
Gordon Bennett defines a Chinese yundong or campaign as “a govern-
ment-sponsored effort to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but 
vulnerable barriers to the progress of socialism through intensive mass 
mobilization of active personal commitment.”156
After analyzing the various mass campaigns conducted in China 
from 1949-1966, Liu has identified four types of campaigns: (1) func-
tionally diffuse and with a target group; (2) functionally diffuse and 
without a target group; (3) functionally specific and with a target group; 
and (4) functionally specific and without a target group.157 Similarly, Cell 
has provided a threefold classification of campaigns based on his defini-
tion: (1) economic campaigns to improve economic conditions and are 
directed at the agricultural, industrial, commercial, and medical sectors; 
(2) ideological campaigns, which are concerned with “changing thinking, 
and cultural and educational standards, correcting erroneous 
thoughts . . ., raising each person’s general political consciousness, and 
opposing anti-socialist forces outside the society”; and (3) struggle cam-
paigns, which attempt to correct erroneous thinking and eliminate the 
power base and/or class position of enemy classes or groups.158
The origins of China’s use of mass campaigns can be traced to 
MAO Zedong’s reliance on “the mass line” to perceive the principal 
“contradictions” in society and to initiate and implement campaigns to
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resolve these “contradictions.”159  The mass mobilization campaign was 
the “central strategy utilizing the mass line”160 as mass line techniques 
were “embodied primarily in waves of mass campaigns.”161  There were 
four stages in a campaign. During the first phase of policy formulation, 
Mao or one of his supporters would suggest the launching of a campaign 
to tackle a “contradiction” or problem. The public announcement of the 
campaign was followed by the dissemination of relevant information by 
means of mobilization meetings, study groups, articles, and press editori-
als discussing the campaign. The third stage entailed mass participation 
by the targeted sectors of the population where there would be mass ral-
lies, self-criticism meetings, and visits to the countryside. The end of the 
campaign was followed by an evaluation, which would discuss whether 
the campaign was effective in resolving the contradiction or whether new 
problems had emerged after the campaign.162
B. The Three Anti and Five Anti Campaigns (1951-1952) 
After the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949, the CCP in-
itiated its first large-scale anti-corruption campaign two years later be-
cause China was still “haunted” by corruption.163 The CCP lacked com-
petent administrative personnel to attain its goal of transforming China 
because its cadre corps consisted of three groups: old cadres, new cadres 
and fresh university graduates, and many retained KMT personnel, intel-
lectuals and specialists. Both the old and new cadres were vulnerable to 
corruption for different reasons and the CCP was concerned that the re-
tained KMT personnel would continue with their previous corrupt prac-
tices.164
The Three Anti (Sanfan) Campaign, which was launched by the 
CCP on August 31, 1951, was a functionally specific urban campaign di-
rected at its members to reduce corruption, waste and bureaucracy.165 It 
was an ideological campaign “against the corrupt and degenerate ideolo-
 159.   Ibid., pp. 12-18. 
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gy of the bourgeoisie,”166 which ended in May 1952 and involved “the 
all-out mobilization of both party cadres and the general public.” The 
Austerity Inspection Commissions (AICs) were established at each 
level to coordinate the anti-corruption activities of the CCP’s DICs, the 
administrative supervision commissions, the procurate, and the courts.167
Mao was personally involved in the Sanfan Campaign because he 
was responsible for setting its “course, guiding principles, and policies” 
and issuing important instructions during November and December 
1951.168 He also read and commented on major reports and telegrams 
from various provinces and ministries on their anti-corruption activities. 
He had sent telegrams to provincial leaders to urge them to catch those 
“big tigers,” that is, those who had embezzled a large amount of money 
and materials. Mao had also approved the execution of two senior offi-
cials, LIU Qingshan and ZHANG Zishan, who were found guilty of graft 
and embezzlement.169
There were four phases in the Three Anti Campaign: (1) the inspec-
tion phase organized by the AICs for mutual inspections between superi-
or and subordinate officers; (2) the confession phase where those cadres 
who had committed embezzlement and graft were pressured to make 
confessions and self-criticism instead of concealing their misconduct; (3) 
the denunciation phase where the masses and lower-level officials and 
staff were mobilized to “confront their corrupt superiors and expose 
wrongdoing, which they would otherwise not have dared to do”; and (4) 
the investigation or “tiger-hunting” phase of catching those suspected 
cadres who had not confessed earlier for their wrongdoing. Each unit was 
given a quota of “tigers” to hunt.170 The Sanfan Campaign conducted 
“struggle meetings” throughout China to attack offending cadres and re-
move them from office by mass demand.171 During the campaign period, 
there was “a spectacle of astonishing disclosures of serious corruption 
and waste in government, of accusations against government officials of 
all ranks (excepting the top leadership of the Communist Party), and of 
confessions made ‘voluntarily’ or under various degrees of pressure.”172
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Table 5: Participants of Three Anti Campaign and “Tigers” Caught 
by Region, 1951-52 
Region Total Participants “Tigers” (those embezzling 

























Total 3,850,513 (100%) 107,830 (2.8%) 
Source: Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chi-
nese Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 56, Table 2.1. 
HO Kan-chih, the CCP’s official historian, estimated that 4.5 per-
cent of all state officials in China were punished during the Three Anti 
Campaign.173  Table 5 shows that, in terms of participation, the campaign 
was most effective in North China (23.1 percent), followed by Eastern 
China (20.7 percent) and Northeast China (19.6 percent), and the least 
effective in Inner Mongolia (1.1 percent). However, Southwest China 
was most effective in catching “tigers” (those who had embezzled more 
than 1,000 yuan) (5.9 percent), followed by Inner Mongolia (4.4 per-
cent). Table 5 also shows that among the 3.85 million cadres in govern-
ment agencies above the county level who participated in the campaign, 
107,830 “tigers” (2.8 percent) were caught. However, 10,009 “tigers” 
(9.3 percent) were sentenced to imprisonment and only 42 “tigers” (0.04 
percent) were executed. The number of “tigers” punished was fewer than 
Mao had expected because many cadres who were initially accused of 
graft were subsequently spared from any disciplinary action.174
In sum, the Sanfan Campaign was effective in mass mobilization 
against corruption in the short term. It demonstrated the CCP’s commit-
ment to curb corruption among its members and enhance its legitimacy 
among the urban population.175 However, it had unintended consequenc-
es such as backlash and personal vengeance in the long run. The director 
of the CCP’s Central Organization Department admitted that a mass 
campaign was ineffective in changing the behavior of the participants 
because “no sooner is the campaign over than they would return to their 
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old selves.”176  Another serious problem was that those officials who 
were criticized or denounced by their subordinates retaliated against the 
latter by “fixing them” (zheng ren) or “giving them tight shoes to wear” 
(chuan xiaoxie).177
The Wufan Campaign was implemented throughout urban China 
during the first half of 1952 and was directed against businessmen and 
industrialists who were alleged to be guilty of spreading the “five poi-
sons”: “bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on govern-
ment contracts, and stealing state economic information.”178 After the 
PRC’s establishment in October 1949, many CCP members including 
veterans became complacent and enriched themselves by accepting 
bribes, using public funds for private business ventures, and selling pub-
lic property to private individuals.179  The number of tax evasion cases by 
capitalists increased from 49,175 in 1949 to 139,068 by November 
1951.180 Apart from evading taxes, many capitalists also stole state as-
sets, cheated on government contracts, and stole state economic data. 
The CCP was also concerned that many private entrepreneurs were “pull-
ing out” old and new cadres by buying them “banquets, gifts, sales com-
missions, and beautiful girls.”181
Corruption was a serious problem in Shanghai and other cities in 
China where the CCP members were working closely with “bourgeois 
elements.” Following the Sanfan Campaign, which purged the “corrupt 
elements” within the CCP, the bureaucracy, and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the Wufan Campaign attacked the bourgeoisie for spreading the 
“five poisons” and for being the source of the anti-social and decadent 
attitudes of urban China.182 On December 27, 1951, the CCP established 
the Shanghai Increase Production and Practice Economy Committee to 
control the processes of propaganda and inspection and to handle cas-
es.183  This Committee instructed the branch committee members to at-
tack the corrupt practices in every business by conducting “self-
examination” and organizing mutual inspections.184
Following the Sanfan Campaign, “accusations, public trials, confes-
sions, huge mass meetings and the like [also] marked” the Wufan Cam-
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paign.185 Public support for the Wufan Campaign was initiated by en-
couraging citizens to participate in “denunciation meetings, presenting 
specific accusations against individuals in public trials, serving on inves-
tigation teams, [and] offering information on ‘unconfessed’ or undiscov-
ered offenders.”186 The Wufan Campaign surpassed its predecessor in 
scale because it investigated more than 450,000 business firms in the 
nine largest cities in China. Since hoarding was endemic in China, the 
Wufan Campaign “pried loose much frozen wealth” and relied on “terror-
istic methods” to provide “new recruits for the concentration camps in 
the interior.” These purges struck fear in the hearts of the officials, but 
did not consolidate the state apparatus.187
The Five Anti Campaign was also significant because “it enabled 
the leadership to consolidate its power in urban China by extending its 
influence over both the bourgeoisie and the working class.”188  Apart 
from changing old attitudes and habits, the campaign also enabled the 
CCP to curb the problem of bourgeois corruption and “curtail severely 
the independence of the industrial and commercial groups after 1952.”189
However, “the supreme irony” was that even though the campaign suc-
ceeded in eliminating bourgeois corruption, the CCP could not eliminate 
corruption among its own members.190 Furthermore, the campaign had 
mixed results because it succeeded in curbing bribery and tax evasion, 
but at the expense of slowing down the economy and increasing unem-
ployment due to the closure of many business firms. The economic re-
cession resulted in massive unemployment and economic hardship 
among the urban population.191
Chen and Chen have indicated that both campaigns provided the 
state with US$1,250 million from the fines collected from offenders, de-
linquent tax assessments, and “returned stolen assets” including confis-
cated property in order to meet the high costs of the Korean war.192 Both 
campaigns had also enhanced the power of the state over both private 
business and the mobilization of the population as a whole.193 However, 
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their implementation not only exposed the extent of corruption in the 
government and CCP, but the Sanfan Campaign also showed that many 
cadres at the village level could not be trusted to enforce agrarian reform 
projects properly without “deviations” and adopting a correct “working 
style.”194
Perhaps, the most serious weakness of the CCP’s reliance on “mass 
mobilization” campaigns is the inherent difficulty of sustaining emotions 
“at a high pitch” because “public interest shifts and emotions subside” 
when the appeal or novelty wears off. The implementation of both cam-
paigns shows that “despite the attendant fanfare and elaborate trappings, 
public interest lagged after the first weeks.”  Some people complained 
that they were so exhausted by the Sanfan Campaign that they could not 
participate in both the Wufan Campaign and the spring sowing.195
C. Major Features of Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign 
The major difference between the Maoist campaigns and its post-
Mao variant was that the former involved “high degrees of mass mobili-
zation” while the latter lacked the “mass mobilizational element” and 
were launched by “the leadership to focus the state bureaucracy on en-
forcement of previously existing rules and laws.”196 The anti-corruption 
campaigns in China during the 1980s and 1990s were anti-corruption 
struggles (fan fubai douzheng) characterized by these two features: en-
hanced publicity to encourage the public to report corruption and corrupt 
officials to confess their misconduct and the demand by the political 
leaders to increase the enforcement of the anti-corruption measures. The 
second feature reflects the leaders’ reliance on “enforcement figures as 
political performance targets” because they “view increased cases as evi-
dence of greater anti-corruption commitment, not more corruption.” In 
other words, “more cases connote enforcement success, not deterrence 
failure.”197 The CCP has launched anti-corruption campaigns to “reclaim 
ruling legitimacy and re-establish itself as the moral agent at a time when 
its apparatuses are infested with corruption.”198
Like the functionally specific Three Anti and Five Anti Campaigns 
of 1951-1952, which were directed toward senior government officials 
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and businessmen, XI Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is wider in 
scope since it targets both senior and junior officials i.e., the “tigers” and 
the “flies.”  At the same time, Xi’s campaign is also an ideological and 
struggle campaign because it is directed at changing the corrupt behavior 
of senior and junior officials as well as eroding the power base and/or 
class position of enemy classes or groups.
Yundong or mass campaigns in China perform these seven func-
tions: (1) implementing an existing policy; (2) emulating advanced expe-
rience; (3) introducing and popularizing a new policy; (4) correcting de-
viations from important public norms; (5) rectifying leadership 
malpractices among responsible cadres or organizations; (6) purging 
from office individuals whose political opposition is excessive; and (7) 
effecting “enduring changes in both individual attitudes and social insti-
tutions which will contribute to the growth of a collective spirit and sup-
port the construction of socialism.”199 Following Bennett’s list of seven 
functions, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign focuses on the fourth, fifth and 
sixth functions by minimizing corrupt practices among senior and junior 
officials.
The first feature of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is its durability. 
Unlike previous campaigns, it has lasted for more than two years and is 
unlikely to end soon. On August 25, 2014, WANG Qishan, the CCDI 
secretary, indicated that the anti-corruption campaign would last for an-
other five years and reminded officials to avoid the mid-autumn tradition 
of providing mooncakes as gifts.200 On March 2, 2015, LIU Xinhua, the 
spokesman for the third session of the 12th National Committee of the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, confirmed that Chi-
na’s current anti-corruption campaign “has no limit or ceiling” and that 
“no one has impunity.”201  The same message was reiterated one day lat-
er by Premier LI Keqiang, who declared that “our tough stance on cor-
ruption is here to stay; our tolerance for corruption is zero, and anyone 
found guilty of corruption will be dealt with seriously.”202 Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign is a “game-changer” because it is “on-going and ex-
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tensive, and implemented in tandem with [a] crackdown on official ex-
travagance and overspending on banquets, gifts and overseas trips.”203
Second, Xi’s campaign is “the most sustained and intensive drive 
against corruption” since 1978 because it is a war waged on these four 
fronts: (1) a guerrilla war at the grassroots level where whistle-blowers 
and netizens employ social media to expose low-level corrupt officials; 
(2) trench warfare against corrupt officials below the county and depart-
ment levels; (3) corruption in the business sector or “commercial brib-
ery”; and (4) corruption as a weapon in factional infighting among the 
CCP leaders.204 BO Xilai’s fall from power meant that he was no longer
Xi’s political rival and the investigations of ZHOU Yongkang and his 
protégés for corruption enabled Xi to further consolidate his power.205
Third, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign also focuses on curbing Chi-
nese officials’ extravagance on public expenses such as vehicles, ban-
quets and overseas trips or sangong xiaofei, which had generated a great 
deal of public criticism.206 CHEN Gang traces such extravagance to the 
granting to magistrates in imperial China of political privileges and gen-
erous fringe benefits in addition to their modest salaries. The political 
status of these magistrates was linked to the extent of extravagance 
shown to them in official receptions, banquets and travelling. An offi-
cial’s status and rank was also reflected in the quality of his official se-
dan chair (guanjiao) and the number of followers and sedan chair bear-
ers. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) the number of sedan chair 
carriers ranged from two for a courtling, to eight for a minister or gover-
nor, to the maximum of 64 bearers for the emperor.207
Not surprisingly, official cars in contemporary China are also 
ranked according to their engine capacity and cost. A 2004 regulation 
specifies that a minister is entitled to an official car with a 3-litre engine 
capacity that costs 450,000 yuan (US$71,000). A vice-minister is entitled 
to a 3-litre capacity car worth 350,000 yuan (US$55,293) and an official 
below the vice-ministerial rank is allocated a 2-litre capacity official car 
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costing 250,000 yuan (US$39,494). However, in practice, this regulation 
has not been enforced strictly at the local or provincial levels.208
The banquet is an important aspect of Chinese culture and its prima-
ry purpose is “to create and maintain social harmony.”209 Since “eating is 
symbolic of showing good faith — ‘giving each other face’” – the Chi-
nese prefer to establish informal relationships first with potential busi-
ness partners by having a meal together to get to know each other in a 
casual setting to enable both parties to establish guanxi. The belief is that 
when two parties can sit down to eat a meal harmoniously they can trust 
each other in business.210 The Chinese officials’ penchant for “alcohol 
banquets” or jiu xi is related to China’s culture of wining and dining at 
lavish banquets to facilitate networking in politics and business. In China 
and many Asian countries, drinking alcoholic beverages is associated 
with fostering “new personal, political, and business relationships, and in 
celebrating business and political events.”211
The lavishness of a banquet is linked to the respect accorded by the 
host for his guests and “the amount of alcohol consumed by either side” 
is “an indication of the level of political trust and friendship.”212  Alcohol 
was “such a reliable choice [as a bribe] that the state media conceded that 
sales of the country’s most famous liquor, Kweichow Moutai, was ‘an 
index for China’s corruption.’”213 Its price increased from 200 yuan per 
bottle in 2005 to 2,000 yuan per bottle in 2012 because of the demand 
generated by its widespread use at official dinners.214 Consequently, re-
ciprocating Chinese drinking and dining hospitality can be expensive 
since the cost depends on the pomp of the banquet and the restaurant’s 
head rate (biao zhem) increases with the rank of the banquet guests.215
The problem of “illegitimate feasting” is not new since Liu found 
that it was the second most common type of corruption among the 304 
media reports of corruption in China from 1977 to 1980. The illegitimate 
feasting and cadres’  lavish, traditional style weddings and funerals ad-
versely affect the CCP member’s dongfen or style of work and under-
 208.  Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
 209.  Matthew B. Christensen, Decoding China: A Handbook for Traveling, Studying, and 
Working in Today’s China (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing, 2013), p. 232. 
 210.  Geoff Baker and Helen Zhang, Inside the Chinese Mind: A Guide on How the Chi-
nese Think (Singapore: CENGAGE Learning Asia, 2012), p. 132. 
 211.  De Mente, The Chinese Way in Business, p. 82. 
 212.  Chen, “China Curbs Official Extravagance,” p. 8. 
 213.  Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth and Faith in the New China 
(London: Bodley Head, 2014), p. 250. 
 214.  Chen, “China Curbs Official Extravagance,” p. 10. 
 215.  De Mente, The Chinese Way in Business, p. 83. 
44 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES
mine the communist ideal that he ought to be “a revolutionary ascetic.”216
Contrary to Mao’s observation that “revolution is not a dinner party,” LI 
Cheng contends that “for the rich and corrupt officials, the reform has 
literally been a ‘dinner party’” as a 1992 survey revealed that US$18 bil-
lion of public funds were spent on dinner banquets.217
Since the Chinese officials’ extravagance on the three public ex-
penses can be traced to the tradition in Imperial China of relying on the 
lavishness of official sedan chairs and banquets to differentiate the rank-
ing of officials, it will be difficult for the central government to curb such 
extravagance across the country without “detailed regulations and strict 
enforcement.”218 Consequently, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign should be 
viewed as an attempt to rectify the shortcoming of previous efforts to 
curb official extravagance on the three public expenses. 
Accordingly, the CCP Politburo meeting chaired by XI Jinping on 
December 4, 2012 passed the following “Eight Directives” or baxiang
guiding:
1. Do investigations and research, guard against going through 
the motions and practicing formalism, travel light with a only a 
small entourage, reduce accompanying staff, and simplify re-
ceptions with people; 
2. Simplify meeting activities, enhance the effectiveness of meet-
ings,  shorten meetings and speeches, and ban empty talk and 
verbiage;
3. Simplify documents and bulletins, stop routinely issuing doc-
uments and reports that have no real content and that need not 
be issued; 
4. Standardize official visits abroad, strictly control the numbers 
of accompanying personnel, and strictly use communications 
tools according to regulations; 
5. Improve security work, reduce traffic controls, and under gen-
eral conditions not block traffic, clear areas or close off hotels 
or restaurants; 
6. Improve news reporting, decide questions of whether or not to 
report Politburo members presiding over meetings and other 
activities according to the needs of work, news value, and so-
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cial effects, and progressively reduce the volume, number and 
length of reports; 
7. Regulate issuance of draft documents and, except under uni-
form central provisions, stop publishing their own works or 
speech collections in open media, and stop issuing congratula-
tory letters or telegrams or writing inscriptions; and 
8. Strictly enforce working hard and practicing economy, and 
strictly carry out relevant work and livelihood remuneration 
regulations with regard to allocation of housing, cars, etc.219
Xi himself followed these “Eight Directives” during his first official 
tour of Shenzhen, Zuhai and Guangzhou in Guangdong Province after 
the meeting by travelling in a small minibus instead of a limousine and 
dispensing with lavish receptions and ceremonies.220  However, it ap-
pears that the sixth directive of maintaining a low public profile does not 
apply to him because according to an observer, “he draws the press untir-
ing attention and enjoys high-profile publicity on the media notwith-
standing the CCP Central Committee’s Eight Rules discouraging ‘nones-
sential’ detail coverage or long reports of the top leaders’ daily 
activities.”221 Furthermore, contrary to the seventh directive of not pub-
lishing books or speech collections, Xi published in 2014 The Govern-
ance of China, which is a compilation of the 79 speeches he made from 
November 12, 2012 to June 13, 2014.222 On January 11, 2015, 
Xinhuanet.com announced the publication of another book compiling 
Xi’s 216 remarks on anti-corruption drawn from his 40 speeches, articles 
and written instructions from November 15, 2012 to October 23, 2014.223
The “Eight Directives” were implemented by 17 provinces and mu-
nicipalities from January 2013 in order to streamline the bureaucracy and 
curb waste and extravagance.224  Since VIP cards for private clubs be-
came popular after the implementation of the “Eight Directives” all anti-
corruption officials in China were ordered in late May by WANG 
Qishan, the CCDI’s Secretary, to surrender their private club VIP cards 
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before June 20, 2013 because these cards can be used to pay for the ser-
vices provided at these clubs.225  Also since access to vehicles is a perk 
given to senior CCP members and government officials, the new regula-
tions issued on May 1, 2013 banned the owners of luxury foreign cars 
like BMW and Bentley from applying for military and armed police li-
cense plates because these plates enabled their owners “to skirt traffic 
laws with impunity and skip toll fees.”226  In November 2013, the State 
Council banned provincial level officials from using official cars for 
general use. On January 14, 2014, the State Council disallowed military 
officers from purchasing foreign made vehicles.227
In order to curb extravagance on galas and official dinners, a regula-
tion banning all government agencies from using public funds to organ-
ize galas was issued by the State Council on November 25, 2013. This 
was followed by another regulation in December 2013 which removed 
shark’s fin soup, bird’s nest soup and wild animal products from the 
menu and prohibited the provision of free cigarettes and expensive liquor 
at official dinners.228 During the same month, the CCP’s General Office 
and the State Council’s General Office issued these “Six Injunctions” or 
liuxiang jinling: 
1. Officials are prohibited from using public funds to pay for vis-
its, gifts, receptions and banquets during the New Year cele-
brations.
2. Officials are prohibited from giving complimentary local 
products to their superiors. 
3. Officials are banned from accepting gifts, cash, gift vouchers 
or prepaid cards. 
4. Officials are not allowed to take part in high-end recreational 
activities or to use official receptions to host families or friends 
during the holidays. Officials are banned from using public 
vehicles for private matters. 
5. All receptions should strictly follow the guidelines of the cen-
tral and provincial governments. 
 225.  Choi Chi-yuk, “Surrender your private club VIP cards, China’s anti-graft officials are 
told,” South China Morning Post, May 28, 2013. 
 226.  William Wan, “China curbs use of coveted military license plates in latest anti-
corruption move,” Washington Post, April 1, 2013. 
 227.  Tim Donovan, “China’s Crackdown on Corruption and Government Spending: A 
Timeline,” China Business Review, January 23, 2014. 
 228.  Ibid., and J.T. Quigley, “No more Shark’s Fin Soup and Bird’s Nest Soup at CCP 
Banquets,” The Diplomat, December 9, 2013.  
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6. All officials are banned from organizing or participating in 
gambling activities.229
The fourth feature of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is its reliance on in-
spection teams (xunshizu), which are dispatched across China to investi-
gate corruption in corruption-prone provinces, ministries, state corpora-
tions and public service organizations. These inspection teams scrutinize 
the work of the cadres, government officials, legislators and political ad-
visers.230  This practice is inspired by the sending of imperial envoys 
(qinchai dachen) by the emperor to oversee officials in the provinces in 
the past. The CCDI sent the first batch of 10 inspection teams during 
May to July 2013 to various locations with each team being stationed for 
two months to provide feedback on corruption to the CCDI. The second 
batch of 10 inspection teams was dispatched to other locations from Oc-
tober to December 2013.231  Table 6 provides details of these 20 inspec-
tion teams and their locations. 
Table 6: CCDI’s Inspection Teams, May to December 2013
Serial No. of 
Inspection Team 
Location of Inspection 
(First batch, May-July) 
Location of Inspection 
(Second batch, October-
December) 
No. 1 China Grain Reserves           
Corporation 
Ministry of Commerce 
No. 2 Hubei Province Xinhua News Agency 
No. 3 Ministry of Water Resources Ministry of Land and Resources 
No. 4 Inner Mongolia Jilin Province 
No. 5 Chongqing City Yunnan Province 
No. 6 Guizhou Province Shanxi Province 
No. 7 China Publishing Group        
Corporation 
Anhui Province 
No. 8 Jiangxi Province Guangdong Province 
No. 9 Export-Import Bank of China Three Gorges Corporation 
No. 10 Renmin University of China Hunan Province 
Source: Xinhua News Agency quoted in Chen Gang, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign,” EAI Background Brief, No. 933 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, 
National University of Singapore, June 30, 2014), p. 9, Table 2. 
The CCDI’s reliance on these inspection teams has reaped divi-
dends since their inception. In 2013, these teams have investigated 
 229.  Chen Gang, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” Appendix 2, 
“Xi Jinping’s Rules against Red Tape and Extravagance,” pp. 18-19. 
 230.  Zhou Dongxu, “How inspection teams expose graft in China,” Caixin Online, July 16, 
2014.
 231.  Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 8. 
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182,000 officials, which is 13 percent more than in 2012.232 The inspec-
tion teams discovered widespread corruption in the provinces of Shanxi, 
Hunan, Guizhou and Jiangxi, and in the China Grain Reserves Corpora-
tion, Renmin University and the Three Gorges Corporation.233 The CCDI 
inspection team based in Hunan Province exposed an electoral fraud 
scandal, which forced more than 500 municipal lawmakers to resign, and 
dismissed 56 representatives of the Hunan People’s Congress  for being 
elected through bribery.234 The investigations of “big tigers” or high-
level corrupt officials targeted in Xi’s anti-graft campaign have revealed 
many cases where “tiger wives” played an important role in their hus-
bands’ corruption. Not surprisingly, the CCDI inspection teams have 
found family corruption in regions where the officials’ spouses and fami-
lies have taken advantage of their husbands’ or fathers’ power to reap 
personal benefits.235
Consequently, the CCDI sent two batches of 13 inspection teams 
from March to September 2014 to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 13 prov-
inces, three autonomous regions, three corporations, two ministries and 
two academic institutions. Table 7 provides details of these 26 inspection 
teams and their locations. 
Table 7: CCDI Inspection Teams, March to September 2014 
Serial No. of 
Inspection Team 
Location of Inspections 
(First batch, March-May) 
Location of Inspections 
(First batch, July-September) 
No. 1 Gansu Province Guangxi Autonomous Region 
No. 2 Beijing Shanghai 
No. 3 Ningxia Autonomous Region Qinghai Province 
No. 4 Shandong Province Tibet Autonomous Region 
No. 5 Tianjin Zheijiang Province 
No. 6 Xinjiang & Xinjiang          
Production & Construction      
Corporation 
Hebei Province 
No. 7 Hainan Province Shaanxi Province 
No. 8 Henan Province Heilongjiang Province 
No. 9 Fujian Province Sichuan Province 
No. 10 Ministry of Science and  
Technology 
Chinese Academy of Sciences 
 232.  Donovan, “China’s Crackdown on Corruption and Government Spending.”
 233.  Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 8. 
 234.  Ibid., p. 9 and “China: More than 500 resign over election fraud,” BBC News China, 
December 28, 2013. 
 235.  “Inside the lives of the ‘tiger wives’: Anti-graft campaign brings to light misdeeds of 
corrupt officials’ spouses,” Global Times, March 30, 2015. See also, Minnie Chan, “‘Tiger
Wife’ who wooed doomed major general,” South China Morning Post, March 22, 2015. 
 HUNTING THE CORRUPT “TIGERS” AND “FLIES” IN CHINA 49 
No. 11 Liaoning Province General Administration of Sport 
No. 12 Fudan University Jiangsu Province 
No. 13 China National Cereals, Oil & 
Foodstuffs Corporation 
FAW Group 
Source: Xinhua News Agency quoted in Chen Gang, “Wang Qishan and China’s Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection,” EAI Background Brief, No. 1012 (Singapore: 
East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, April 2, 2015), pp. 16-17, Table 5. 
The CCDI traps a corrupt official by arranging a high-profile meet-
ing which requires his attendance. The CCDI investigators then wait out-
side the meeting room and monitor the meeting by using surveillance 
cameras and receiving text messages from someone attending the meet-
ing.  At an appropriate moment, the CCDI investigators would enter the 
meeting room to arrest the targeted official in the presence of the other 
senior officials attending the meeting to intimidate and warn them of the 
consequences of being corrupt. The tactics employed by the CCDI inves-
tigators to trap and arrest WAN Qingliang, the Party Secretary in Guang-
zhou, on June 27, 2014 are described in the People’s Net, the online pub-
lication of the CCP on February 2, 2015.236
The fifth feature of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is that it has re-
sulted in the investigation of 71 civilian “tigers” or officials of vice-
ministerial rank or above and 30 military “tigers” in the PLA during its 
first two and a quarter years. WANG Qishan, the CCDI’s Secretary, has 
explained that “catching the tigers is a way to intimidate others” since the 
objective of the CCDI investigators is to ensure that officials “don’t dare
to commit corruption, cannot be corrupt, and don’t want to be cor-
rupt.”237 Table 8 provides details of the 71 civilian “tigers” investigated 
by the CCDI for corruption offenses from December 2012 to March 
2015.
Table 8: Senior officials investigated by the CCDI, December 2012 to 
March 2015 
No. Name Position Date of 
Dismissal or 
Investigation
1 LI Chuncheng Deputy Party Secretary, Sichuan Province December 2012 
2 YI Junqing Chief of CCP Central Compilation and 
Translation Bureau 
January 2013 
3 WU Yongwen Vice-Chairman, Hubei Provincial People’s
Congress 
January 2013 
 236.  Frank Fang, “Setting a trap for China’s corrupt officials,” Epoch Times, February 4, 
2015.
 237.  Ibid. 
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4 LIU Tienan Deputy Director, National Development 
and Reform Commission 
May 2013 
5 NI Fake Vice-Governor of Anhui Province June 2013 
6 GUO Yongxiang Vice-Governor of Sichuan Province June 2013 
7 WANG Suyi Minister of United Front of Inner       
Mongolia
June 2013 
8 LI Daqiu Vice-Chairman, People’s Political       




Deputy General Manager, China National 
Petroleum Corporation 
August 2013 
10 LI Huanlin Deputy General Manager, China National 
Petroleum Corporation 
August 2013 
11 JIANG Jiemin Director, State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission 
September
2013 
12 LIAO Shaohua Party Secretary, Zunyi City, Guizhou October 2013 
13 JI Jianye Mayor of Nanjing City, Jiangsu October 2013 
14 CHEN Baihuai Vice-Chairman, People’s Political       
Consultative Conference of Hubei 
November 
2013 
15 GUO Youming Deputy Governor of Hubei Province November 
2013 




17 CHEN Anzhong Vice-Chairman, Jiangsi Provincial      
People’s Congress 
December 2013 
18 YANG Gang Deputy Director, Committee for Economic 
Affairs of Chinese People’s Political   
Consultative Conference 
December 2013 
19 LI Chongxi Chairman, People’s Political Consultative 
Conference of Sichuan 
December 2013 
20 TONG Mingqian Vice-Chairman, People’s Political       
Consultative Conference of Hunan 
December 2013 
21 LI Dongsheng Vice-Minister of Public Security December 2013 
22 JI Wenlin Vice-Governor of Hainan Province February 2014 
23 JIN Daoming Vice-Chairman, Shanxi Provincial      
People’s Congress 
February 2014 
24 ZHU Zuoli Vice-Chairman, People’s Political       
Consultative Conference of Shaanxi    
Province
February 2014 
25 ZHOU Zhenhong Head, United Front Work Department of 
CCP of Guangdong Provincial Committee 
February 2014 
26 SHEN Peiping Vice-Governor of Yunnan Province March 2014 
27 YAO Mugen Vice-Governor of Jiangxi Province March 2014 
28 SHEN Weichen Vice-Chairman, Chinese Association for 
Science and Technology 
April 2014 
29 SONG Lin Chairman of China Resources Holdings April 2014 
30 MAO Xiaobing Party Secretary, Xining City, Qinghai 
Province
April 2014 
31 WEI Jian Director, CCDI No. 4 Office of Discipline 
Inspection and Improvement 
May 2014 
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32 YANG Hanzhong Vice-Secretary, Commission for Political 
and Legal Affairs, CCP Inner Mongolia 
Committee 
May 2014 
33 LI Yali Deputy Police Chief of Taiyuan, Shanxi 
Province
May 2014 
34 CHEN Zengxin Party official, Shanwei, Guangdong    
Province
May 2014 
35 QI Pingjing Deputy Director, China Foreign          
Languages Publishing Administration 
May 2014 
36 LI Xinghua Director, Guangdong Provincial           
Department of Science and Technology 
May 2014 
37 LIANG Daoxing Vice-Mayor, Shenzhen City May 2014 
38 YANG Dacai Director, Shaanxi Administration of Work 
Safety 
May 2014 
39 LEI Zhengfu Party Secretary, Beibei District,      
Chongqing 
May 2014 
40 DUAN Yizhong Inspector, Bureau of Quality and       
Technical Supervision Guangxi Zhuang      
Autonomous Region 
May 2014 
41 ZHENG Beiquan Vice-Mayor and Police Chief, Yingde, 
Guangdong Province 
May 2014 
42 SHAN Zengde Deputy Director, Agricultural Department 
of Shandong Provincial Government 
May 2014 
43 YANG Baohua Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference of Hunan      
Province
May 2014 
44 FANG Xuan Deputy Party Secretary, Guangzhou May 2014 
45 SU Rong Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference National     
Committee 
June 2014 
46 DU Shanxue Vice-Governor of Shanxi Province June 2014 
47 LING Zhengce Vice-Chairman, People’s Political       
Consultative Conference of Shanxi     
Province
June 2014 
48 WAN Qingliang Party Secretary, Guangzhou City,    
Guangdong Province 
June 2014 
49 ZHAO Zhiyong Secretary-General, Party Committee, 
Jiangxi Province 
June 2014 
50 TAN Qiwei Deputy Director, People’s Congress of 
Chongqing 
July 2014 
51 ZHANG Tianxin Member, Standing Committee, Yunnan 
Province
July 2014 
52 HAN Xiancong Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference of Anhui      
Province
July 2014 
53 WU Changsun Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference of Tianjin 
July 2014 
54 CHEN Tiexin Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference of Liaoning 
Province
July 2014 
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55 TAN Hong Senior Officer, Guard Bureau, Ministry of 
Public Security 
July 2014 
56 TAN Li Vice-Governor of Hainan Province July 2014 
57 ZHOU Yongkang Member, Standing Committee of Politburo 
and Secretary, Political and Legislative 
Affairs Committee of CCP Central    
Committee 
July 2014 
58 LING Jihua Vice-Chairman, Chinese People’s Political 





Assistant Foreign Minister January 2015 
60 CAI Guangliao Major General, Paramilitary Armed Police January 2015 
61 YANG Weize Party Secretary, Nanjing City January 2015 
62 SI Xinliang Vice-President, Zhejiang Provincial Peo-
ple’s Political Consultative Conference 
February 2015 
63 JING Chunhua Member, Standing Committee, Hebei   
Provincial Party Committee 
March 2015 
64 QIU He Deputy Party Chief, Yunnan Province March 2015 
65 XU Jianyi Chairman, State-owned China FAW 
Group 
March 2015 
66 LIAO Yongyuan Vice-Chairman, PetroChina March 2015 
67 DAI Haibo Executive Deputy Director, Shanghai Free 
Trade Zone 
March 2015 
68 LIU Xiangdong Head, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Shanxi Province 
March 2015 
69 QI Dacai Vice-President and Director, Southern 
Power Grid, Guandong Province 
March 2015 
70 CUI Jian Vice-President, China Baosteel Group March 2015 
71 XU Gang Deputy Governor, Fujian Province March 2015 
Sources: Compiled by the author from Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi Jinping’s Anti-
Corruption Campaign,” p. 3; Guo Yong and Li Songfeng, “Anti-Corruption Measures in 
China: Suggestions for Reforms,” Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1) (Jan-
uary 2015): 11-12; and newspaper reports. 
Table 9 identifies the 30 military “tigers” and their positions in the 
PLA before their investigation by the CCDI in 2014 and 2015. The PLA 
is “riddled with corruption and professional decay, and asphyxiated by 
the ever-greater effort required to impose political control.”238  Military 
corruption is a serious problem because XU Caihou, the former CMC’s 
Vice-Chairman, had built a corrupt culture in the PLA because the crite-
ria for recruitment and allocation of positions were based on the amount 
of bribes offered and the candidates’ relations with the military leaders. 
Major General YANG Chunchang, a former aide to Xu, said that it was 
 238.  John Garnaut, “Rotting from within: Investigating the massive corruption of the Chi-
nese military,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2012. 
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“an open secret that there are different price levels of bribery for promo-
tion to different military ranks.”239  Xu was investigated for corruption by 
the CCDI in March 2014 and expelled from the CCP in October 2014. 
He died of bladder cancer while in custody on March 15, 2015. 
Table 9: PLA officers investigated by the CCDI, 2014 to March 2015 
No. Name Military Position before Investigation 
1. LIU Zheng Deputy Head, PLA General Logistics Department 
2. YU Daqing Deputy Political Commissar, Second Artillery Force 
3. FAN Changmi Deputy Political Commissar, Lanzhou Military Area       
Command 
4. WANG Minggui Political Commissar, Air Force Command School 
5. FANG Wenping Head, Military Command, Shanxi 
6. WEI Jin Deputy Political Commissar, Tibet Military Command 
7. YE Wanyong Political Commissar, Sichuan Provincial Military Command, 
Chengdu 
8. YANG Jinshan Deputy Commander, Chengdu Military Area Command 
9. ZHANG Qibin Deputy Chief of Staff, Jinan Military Area Command 
10. FU Linguo Deputy Chief of Staff, PLA General Logistics Department 
11. DAI Weimin Deputy President, PLA Nanjing Political College 
12. GAO Xiaoyan Deputy Political Commissar and Chief of Discipline Inspec-
tion, PLA Information Engineering University 
13. MA Xiangdong Head, Political Affairs Department, PLA Nanjing Political 
College
14. ZHANG Daixin Deputy Commander, Heilongjiang Provincial Military Com-
mand
15. CHEN Qiang Deputy Head, PLA Unit 96301 
16. XU Caihou Vice-Chairman, Central Military Commission 
17. ZHU Heping Director, Joint Logistics Department, Chengdu Military Area 
Command 
18. WANG Aiguo Director, Joint Logistics Department, Shenyang Military Area 
Command 
19. HUANG Xianjun Director, Political Department, Shanxi Provincial Military 
Command 
20. DUAN Tianjie Deputy Director, Political Department, PLA National Defense 
University
21. YUAN Shijun Commander, Hubei Provincial Military Command 




Deputy Political Commissar, PLA Second Artillery Force 
24. LIU Hongjie Deputy Director, Management and Support Department, PLA 
General Staff Headquarters 
 239.  “PLA delegates support ongoing anti-graft efforts,” Global Times, March 10, 2015. 
See also, “PLA anti-corruption campaign shows determination to combat issue,” Global 
Times, March 15, 2015. 
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25. CHENG Jie Deputy Chief of Staff, North China Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy 
26. CHEN Jianfeng Deputy Director, Joint Logistics Department, PLA Guangzhou 
Military Area Command 
27. CHEN Hongyan Deputy Director, Political Department, Air Force, PLA Beijing 
Military Area Command 
28. WANG Sheng Director, Logistics Department, Air Force, PLA Guangzhou 
Military Area Command 
29. GUO Zhenggang Deputy Political Commissar, Zhejiang Provincial Military 
Command 
30. LAN Weijie Deputy Commander, Hubei Provincial Military Command 
Sources: Compiled from the information provided by Xinhua News Agency on January 
16 and March 2, 2015; Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “16 PLA officers on graft list,” Global 
Times, January 16, 2015; and Catherine Wong Tsoi-lai, “Military probes 14 senior PLA 
officers for graft,” Global Times, March 3, 2015.
An important objective of President Xi’s campaign is to show the 
citizens that he is concerned about curbing corruption in China by “bag-
ging big tigers.” However, Wedeman warns that “bagging too many big 
tigers can backfire if the public becomes convinced” that “the party’s 
jungle is full of big tigers, senior leadership is full of corrupt tigers, and 
that the only big tigers being hunted are Xi’s political enemies and the 
politically unlucky and unloved whom Xi had sacrificed.”240
From January to November 2013, the procuratorates investigated 
2,703 officials at division level and 204 officials at bureau level and 
above, and 17 ministerial officials. Table 10 shows that during HU 
Jintao’s second term (2008-2012), the procuratorates investigated 13,173 
division and county officials, 950 bureau officials and 30 ministerial of-
ficials, or an annual average of 2,635 division and county officials, 190 
bureau officials and six ministerial officials. Thus, in terms of output, the 
number of officials at all levels investigated by the procuratorates in 
2013 has exceeded their average annual output during 2008 to 2012. 
Table 10: Number of Officials Investigated by the Procuratorates in 
China by Level, 2008-2013 
No. of officials investigated 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Division level and above 2,687 2,670 2,723 2,524 2,569 2,703 
Bureau level and above 181 204 188 198 179 204 
Ministry level and above 4 8 6 7 5 17
Total 2,872 2,882 2,917 2,729 2,753 2,924 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the SPP, quoted in Chen, “The ‘Tigers’ in Xi 
Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” p. 7, Chart 1. 
 240.  Wedeman, “Xi Jinping’s Tiger Hunt and the Politics of Corruption,” 6. 
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In sum, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is different from previous 
campaigns by its length, its focus on curbing official extravagance on 
cars, banquets and overseas travel, its reliance on inspection teams to un-
cover corruption cases, and its investigation of more “tigers” and “flies” 
during its first two and a quarter years. 
VI.  EVALUATION OF XI JINPING’S ANTI-CORRUPTION
CAMPAIGN 
A. Utility of Mass Campaigns in China 
How useful are the mass campaigns in China? In July 1957, ZHOU 
Enlai, the PRC’s first premier, had endorsed the utility of campaigns for 
fostering China’s socialist transformation.241 Based on his analysis of 36 
campaigns conducted in China from April 1950 to December 1971, Cell 
concluded that campaigns were useful for attaining China’s goal of so-
cialist transformation, with the struggle campaigns being the most im-
portant despite their greater shortcomings. These shortcomings resulted 
from their high levels of mobilization and  “over-classification, physical 
abuse, and the use of coercion instead of persuasion.”242 On the other 
hand, with the exception of the Great Leap Forward, the economic cam-
paigns had fewer weaknesses and were the most effective. Ideological 
campaigns were the least useful because of the low level of achieve-
ments, shortcomings and mobilization.243  However, he cautioned that 
China’s campaign mobilization strategy was not a “blueprint for action 
for other societies” because of the “differences between societies in cul-
ture, history, and natural environment.”244
Since mass campaigns in China have stirred political controversy 
among many scholars, Bennett has succinctly summarized the three criti-
cisms as well as the supporting arguments for such campaigns. The first 
criticism was that mass campaigns were “effective as a leadership strate-
gy only temporarily under conditions of great stress” because they were 
appropriately used by the CCP and PLA in their mountainous rural base 
in the 1930s and 1940s. Secondly, critics argued that mass campaigns 
were incompatible with China’s growing industrialization which requires 
“elaborate training and specialization” and moving away from political 
 241.  Cell, Revolution at Work, p. 171. 
 242.  Ibid., pp. 130-131, and 172. 
 243.  Ibid., p. 172. 
 244.  Ibid., p. 175. 
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indoctrination.245 Third, China’s “excessive emphasis on political priori-
ties and hostility toward bureaucratic authority and professionalism” had 
to be curbed by reducing the number of campaigns and their hostility to-
ward professionalism.246
In his study of a central ministry in China, A. Doak Barnett ob-
served that the effects of political campaigns within the bureaucracy 
were “subtle and far-reaching.” This is because “by dramatically demon-
strating the Party’s power to determine the fate of every cadre, and by 
clearly defining attitudes and behavior that are unacceptable to the Par-
ty,” these campaigns “create strong incentives for all cadres to submit to 
the Party’s authority” to reduce the risks of being punished.247 However, 
apart from reinforcing the CCP’s authority, the reliance on these cam-
paigns has also incurred “significant costs and liabilities”: the disruption
of the normal tasks of government and Party administration; neglecting 
problems not highlighted by the current campaigns; waste of time and 
effort because the cadres were diverted from their regular work; and in-
hibiting “the development of an effective government administration of a 
more routinized sort.”248
Barnett concluded that even though campaigns “played an extraor-
dinary role in the operational dynamics of the bureaucracy in China,” the 
regime found it “increasingly difficult to mobilize the cadres and inject a 
high level of tension into the system.” This is because they adapted to the 
repeated campaigns by developing defense mechanisms to avoid the 
same degree of psychological involvement.249 Lynn White contends that 
China’s reliance on campaigns “suggests that regular, reliable legal pun-
ishments must be ineffective.”250
On the other hand, supporters observed that China had to rely on 
mass mobilization of labor power after the CCP assumed power to con-
struct public works, irrigation systems and flood control projects because 
the country lacked the required financial resources to invest in these pro-
jects. Furthermore, mass campaigns were emphasized in China during 
the early 1960s to foster the spirit of self-reliance, which was proclaimed 
as a national goal after the collapse of Sino-Soviet economic coopera-
 245.  Bennett, Yundong, p. 79. 
 246.  Ibid., p. 80. 
 247.  A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 34-35. 
 248.  Ibid., p. 142. 
 249.  Ibid., p. 70. 
 250.  Lynn T. White, “Political Mechanisms and Corruption,” in Gregory C. Chow and 
Dwight H. Perkins (Eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Economy (London: Routledge, 
2015), p. 292. 
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tion. Thirdly, proponents argued that mass campaigns had enhanced de-
velopment by removing bottlenecks caused by “established cliques, priv-
ilege, and administrative routine.” Finally, advocates contended that
mass campaigns were an effective way for solving existing problems if 
they were not excessive and “rhythmically in cycles of tension and relax-
ation.”251
B. Impact of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign 
In his review of the literature on communication campaigns in Chi-
na, WANG Jianglong found that “systematic evaluations with reliable 
and valid measurements are seriously lacking” because researchers relied 
on “mostly anecdotal reports, official Chinese government publications, 
and other less-reliable sources to gauge the effectiveness of communica-
tion campaigns in the PRC.”252 For example, Robert Bishop has argued 
that those campaigns in China which attempted to change the targets’ at-
titudes achieved minimum or superficial effects, while those campaigns 
which targeted behavioural changes accomplished campaign objectives 
temporarily because of the campaign targets’ reluctance to reveal their 
true feelings.253
What has been the impact of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign? The 
first two and a quarter years of the campaign have not made a significant 
impact on China’s perceived extent of corruption, judging from its per-
formance on Transparency International’s CPI and PERC’s surveys of 
corruption from 2012-2015, as shown in Table 11. As indicated at the 
outset of this analysis, China’s drop in rank from 80th to 100th positions 
and score from 40 to 36 on the 2014 CPI was unexpected and not well 
received by the PRC government. 
Table 11: Perceived Level of Corruption in China according to three 
indicators, 1995-2015 
Year Corruption        
Perceptions Index 
Political & Economic 
Risk Consultancy 
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Sources: Compiled from http://www.transparency.org for the CPI rankings and scores 
from 1995-2014; Asian Intelligence, No. 579, March 7, 2001, p. 2; Asian Intelligence, 
No. 750, March 12, 2008, p. 7; Asian Intelligence, No. 871, March 20, 2013, p. 6; Asian 
Intelligence, No. 895, March 19, 2014, p. 1; Asian Intelligence, No. 920, April 1, 2015, p. 
1; and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports. 
On the other hand, the measures introduced to minimize the three 
“public expenses” – the public officials’ reliance on official cars, ban-
quets and overseas trips – have been effective in reducing such expendi-
tures. According to the CCDI, about 20,000 officials were punished in 
2013 for decadence and the violation of the “Eight Directives.” Among 
them, more than 5,000 officials had broken the regulations concerning 
the use of official cars and 903 officials had organized “overly elaborate” 
celebrations.254  On March 15, 2014, the CCDI reported on its website 
that the expenditure on meetings in 2013 declined by 53 percent, fol-
lowed by a decrease of 39 percent for official overseas trips, and a drop 
of 10 percent for vehicle purchases.255
The effectiveness of the regulations for curbing official extrava-
gance manifests in the effects on China’s economic growth and changes 
in the behavior of the corrupt officials. The short term impact of the anti-
corruption campaign is the reduction of economic growth in China in 
2014 by between 0.6 and 1.5 percent, according to LU Ting, a Bank of 
America analyst, with the decline in sales of luxury watches, penthouses, 
cars and other status symbols caused by the official curb on extrava-
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gance.256 China’s annual growth rate for luxury spending decreased from 
7 percent in 2012 to 2 percent in 2013.257 The sales of jewelry, watches 
and other luxury items in Hong Kong have declined by 40 percent in 
April 2014, and by 28 percent in June 2014.258
The crackdown on official extravagance has also resulted in the de-
cline in the hosting of official dinners at five-star hotels in China. The 
average spending per person at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in Shanghai has 
decreased from 1,000 yuan in 2012 to between 600 to 700 yuan in 2014. 
The liquor company Remy Cointreau blames the anti-graft campaign for 
the 32 percent drop in the sales of its high-end brand, Remy Martin in 
China, during January to March 2014.259  The shipment of cognac in 
China has also decreased by 20 percent.260  The Scotch Whiskey Asso-
ciation reported that the sales of whiskey in China declined by 11 percent 
from January to June 2014 as a result of the “anti-extravagance 
measures.”261  To cope with the drastic drop in patronage by officials, 
high-end restaurants in Beijing have removed expensive and exotic dish-
es from their menus. Beijing’s Xiang E. Qing Restaurant, which was a 
favorite of CCP cadres before the anti-graft campaign, replaced shark’s 
fin soup, bird’s nest soup and abalone with “less exotic fare such as 
shredded beef, pickled turnip and fried peanuts.”262  The sales of 
mooncakes in Guangdong Province dropped drastically after the CCDI 
banned the use of public funds to purchase mooncakes as gifts for the 
mid-Autumn festival.263
XI Jinping himself set an example by having a simple dinner of 
“four dishes and one soup” during his official visit to Fuping county in 
Hebei Province in late December 2012.264 Xi’s simple menu was pre-
scribed earlier by the 1988 national campaign to curb public waste and 
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extravagance, which reduced the 10 to 15 dishes usually served at ban-
quets to four dishes and a soup.265  However, the high-profile case of 
HAN Junhong, the Party Secretary of Wangluo, a town in Henan Prov-
ince, who was suspended for not paying his bills of 700,000 yuan 
(US$115,000) over three years at a pig trotter restaurant, illustrates the 
persistence of “wasteful spending and corruption” in China.266  In Janu-
ary 2015, 14 Shenzhen police officers were suspended for assaulting 
three undercover journalists who caught them feasting on a giant sala-
mander at a lavish banquet attended by 28 officials from the Shenzhen 
Police Department.267
On December 18, 2013, the State Council circulated guidelines for 
“funeral and internment reform” to ensure that CCP members and offi-
cials set an example for others by having “simple, civilized funerals 
without monumental gravestones, fireworks and the practice of collect-
ing gifts (bribes).”268 Consequently, ZHANG Hongbao, the owner of the 
Shanghai Funeral Service, claims that his profits have decreased by 20 
percent in 2013 because government officials now “choose simple cere-
monies, such as having quieter events, rather than the noisy rituals of the 
past.”269
The frugality campaign was demonstrated clearly at the annual 
meetings of the NPC held in Beijing in March 2013 and March 2014. 
Fifteen frugality measures were introduced to improve the conduct of the 
2013 NPC. Among the 17 frugality measures implemented at the 2014 
NPC was the reduction of the number of “tea ladies” since the delegates 
were served bottled water instead of tea. To reduce waste, there were no 
red carpets or welcome banners at the hotel lobbies and fruit platters 
were no longer provided in the hotel rooms. Gift-giving and lavish wel-
come ceremonies were banned and delegates were served buffet meals 
without expensive food or wine.270
Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has also changed the behavior of cor-
rupt officials in four ways. First, many corrupt officials who have visited 
the casinos in Macau since 2009 to gamble or launder money have 
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stopped doing so after the initiation of the anti-corruption campaign in 
November 2012. Discretionary spending by Chinese high-rollers, which 
included many corrupt officials, increased Macau’s gambling revenue in 
2012 to US$38 billion.271  However, casino revenue in Macau decreased 
in June and July 2014 by 3.6 percent from 2013 since high-rollers from 
China stayed away. In July 2014, the revenue from VIP gamblers from 
China declined by 14 to 18 percent.272  The gross gambling revenue in 
Macau fell by 23.2 percent in October 2014 and by 19.6 percent in No-
vember 2014 compared to the same period in 2013.273  Hoffman Ma, 
Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Ponte 16 Resort in Macau, observes 
that the high rollers are “spending less to avoid drawing attention amid 
the government’s fierce anti-corruption campaign.”274  Consequently, the 
Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau in Macau reported that the 
highest decrease in casino revenue was 30.4 percent in December 2014 
and the annual revenue for 2013 dropped by 2.6 percent to 351.5 billion 
patacas (US$44 billion).275 In January 2015, the gaming revenue in Ma-
cau dropped by 17.4 percent to 23.7 billion patacas (US$3 billion).276
The second way in which corrupt officials in China have changed as 
a result of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is that they have become more cau-
tious in accepting bribes or helping their relatives and friends to avoid 
detection and punishment. CHEN Jin has offered a bribe of 100,000 yuan 
(US$16,000) to enroll her 12-year old daughter in a top middle school in 
a city in Hebei Province but no official has accepted her offer after four 
months. Furthermore, CAI Xiaopeng, a businessman in Beijing, has ad-
mitted that he usually spends a million yuan a year to bribe more than 
100 officials from many departments. However, because  he has received 
fewer calls from officials requesting gifts before the mid-Autumn festival 
in 2014, he saved 800,000 yuan in bribes last year.  To avoid getting 
caught, corrupt officials are more cautious now and only accept bribes 
from those they trust and also demand higher amounts. A jeweller from 
Henan Province said that he had to pay three times more than the usual 
bribe to get a permit to open a new shop.277
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The third change is that local officials are reluctant to perform their 
regular duties for fear of being punished for making mistakes and also 
because there is no longer any financial incentive for them to implement 
large investment projects. An official in Beijing admitted that “nobody
wants to do anything” because “if we do things, we are exposed to all 
kinds of risks, including political risks. And we don’t have financial in-
centives.”278  Consequently, the reluctance of local officials to perform 
their functions has delayed the implementation of many projects. Ac-
cordingly, on February 9, 2015 Premier LI Keqiang asked local officials 
to sign a written pledge to implement major economic and social policies 
faithfully because their dereliction of duty has delayed the implementa-
tion of large projects and investment plans in the agricultural and water 
conservation industries.279 PEI Minxin contends that local officials have 
reacted to Xi’s anti-graft campaign by engaging in “passive resistance” 
because he “has taken away their cheese without offering anything in re-
turn.”  The local officials are engaged in a test of wills with XI Jinping 
because they know that the CCP’s survival will be threatened if “they 
stopped working indefinitely and the economy sank.” They demand to be 
allowed to return to their corrupt ways because “if you don’t allow us to 
have a comfortable, corrupt life, we are not going to work for you.”280
The fourth effect of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is that it has in-
creased the number of suicides among corrupt officials in China. In 
2013, of the 54 officials who died from “unnatural deaths” (including 
over-drinking and accidents), 23 officials committed suicide.281  The me-
dia in China reported that 30 officials committed suicide from January to 
September 2014. This figure indicates that the suicide rate among senior 
Chinese officials is 30 percent higher than the suicide rate in China’s cit-
ies. On January 31, 2015, Peng Pai, a new-state-funded online media out-
let, reported that 77 people killed themselves during 2013 and 2014 
compared to 68 persons during 2003 to 2012.282
Corrupt officials commit suicide not only to avoid long prison 
terms, public shame and loss of face, but also to protect their wives, chil-
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dren and parents so that they will “survive and not lose their wealth.”283
As disciplinary investigations are terminated with the deaths of the prime 
suspects, some corrupt officials choose to commit suicide to prevent 
bringing shame to their families. Thus, the suicides of corrupt Chinese 
officials reflect not only the psychological impact of Xi’s anti-graft cam-
paign, but also the limited care and help available for depressed offi-
cials.284 As many officials had previously tried to commit suicide by hit-
ting their heads against the walls in the interview rooms, Professor LIN 
Zhe of the Central Party School revealed that the interview rooms at the 
disciplinary detention center in Shanghai have soft rubber walls to pre-
vent officials who are interrogated from committing suicide.285
A final unintended consequence of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is 
that it has led to a decline between 10 to 37 percent in the number of job 
applications for the civil service in 16 provinces and municipalities. The 
highest decrease occurred in Zheijiang Province where the number of 
persons sitting for the annual entrance examination decreased from 
360,000 in March 2013 to 227,000 in March 2014 .286  The number of 
persons taking the national civil service examination in China has de-
creased from 1.12 million in 2013 to 900,000 in 2014. A recent online 
survey conducted by the China Youth Daily found that 51.6 percent of 
the respondents admitted that the anti-corruption campaign was the most 
important reason for the drop in the number of applicants to join the civil 
service. 
The “Eight Directives” and curbs on official extravagance have re-
duced the attractiveness of a civil service career because of the absence 
of the “hidden benefits” of being an official, which include “lavish ban-
quet meals and government-sponsored stays in luxury hotels.”287  With-
out these extra benefits and perks, the actual monthly salaries of civil 
servants are very low. Hence, it is not surprising that in April 2013, five 
months after the initiation of Xi’s anti-graft campaign, a journalist has 
described the job of a Chinese government official as “one of the worst 
jobs in the world.”  The “life as a Chinese government official isn’t what 
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it used to be” because “lavish, liquor-heavy banquets have been out-
lawed” and it will also be harder to get those military license plates to 
avoid dealing with the traffic police.288
C. Treating Symptoms but not Causes of Corruption 
Since corruption is a difficult problem to solve, many countries 
have failed in their anti-corruption efforts partly because their efforts 
have focused on the symptoms of corruption instead of its causes. Steven 
Levitt and Stephen Dubner explain why it is easier to deal with the 
symptoms of corruption than with addressing its root causes: 
But the big problems that society cares about — crime and dis-
ease and political dysfunction, for instance — are more com-
plicated than that. Their root causes are often not so nearby, or 
obvious, or palatable. So rather than address their root causes, 
we often spend billions of dollars treating the symptoms and 
are left to grimace when the problem remains. . . . Alas, fixing 
corruption is a lot harder than airlifting food. . . . But when you 
are dealing with root causes, at least you know you are fighting 
the real problem and not just boxing with shadows.289
XI Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign’s emphasizes treating the
symptoms of corruption without addressing its causes, which makes it 
the campaign’s Achilles’ heel. This may also explain why the campaign 
has been ineffective in minimizing corruption in China during its first 
two and a quarter years. This limitation is not surprising since as Bennett 
has astutely observed, the fourth objective of a mass campaign was the 
correction of deviations from important public norms. “The tasks of yun-
dong in the correcting deviations category are to draw such deviations 
into the open, raise popular awareness of the political implications of in-
dulging in the deviant practices, and finally, try to stamp them out.” 
However, “often the announced deviations superficially appear to be 
mere symptoms, and yundong run to suppress them seem to toy with the 
symptoms alone instead of squarely addressing the basic causes.”290
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1. Low salaries 
There are five major causes of corruption in China.291  As discussed 
in Section II.B, the low salaries of public officials in imperial China were 
responsible for their corrupt behavior. After the readjustment of salaries 
in 1956, the average salaries of administrative cadres were not “excep-
tionally high.” For example, the minister’s monthly salary was only 400 
yuan, whereas a bureau chief earned between 200 to 250 yuan per 
month.292  The salaries of public officials in contemporary China are still 
low and explain why to a large extent they are corrupt. Senior officials 
have tolerated low salaries during the reform period because they could 
compensate the difference through “corruption with relatively little 
chance of getting caught.”293 Many officials have engaged in such illegal 
strategies such as embezzlement and commercial activities to supplement 
their low official incomes.294  The rampant corruption among the manag-
ers of the SOEs is the result of their low salaries and their unfettered con-
trol over the economic resources of their organizations.295
Table 12 shows that the average annual salary of employees in the 
public sector in China was lower than the average annual salary of em-
ployees in nine other sectors from 2003 to 2007. In 2009, public sector 
salaries were ranked ninth, but their ranking dropped to 11th position in 
2010. The average annual salary of civil servants increased by two and a 
half times from 15,355 yuan (or 1,280 yuan per month) in 2003 to 38,242 
yuan (or 3,187 yuan per month) in 2010.  As mentioned earlier, the anti-
corruption campaign has reduced the attractiveness of the civil service as 
an employer in China because of the curb on official extravagance and 
other perks. The average monthly salary of a department head in the cen-
tral government in 2014 was 3,000 yuan (US$480) while a department 
head at the provincial level earned an average of 2,000 yuan (US$320) a 
month.296
In 1981, Harry Harding astutely attributed the problem of corrup-
tion in China to these two structural causes: “when the opportunity is 
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present,” there are weak penalties, ineffective monitoring mechanisms, 
and bureaucratic discretion; and when the motivation is high with poorly 
paid officials they are “strongly tempted to engage in graft or extor-
tion.”297 The late LEE Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first prime minister, noted 
that the adoption of market reforms in China resulted in the exponential 
increase in corruption because “the salaries of ministers and officials 
were paltry compared with the rest of society, which was growing rich 
very rapidly.”298
Table 12: Average Annual Salary in Yuan in China by Sector,      
2003-2010 
Sector 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010 
Telecommunications and computer 
service
30,897 38,799 47,700 58,154 64,436 
Financial industry 20,780 29,229 44,011 60,398 70,146 
Research and technological services 20,442 27,155 38,432 50,143 56,376 
Electricity, gas and water utilities 18,574 24,750 33,470 41,869 47,309 
Culture, sports and entertainment 17,098 22,670 30,430 37,755 41,428 
Real estate 17,085 20,253 26,085 32,242 35,870 
Tenancy and business services 17,020 21,233 27,807 35,494 39,566 
Health, social security and social 
welfare 
16,185 20,808 27,892 35,662 40,232 
Transport, storage and postal service 15,753 20,911 29,903 35,315 40,466 
Public sector 15,355 20,234 27,731 35,326 38,242 
Education 14,189 18,259 25,908 34,543 38,968 
Mining 13,627 20,449 28,185 38,038 44,196 
Manufacturing 12,671 15,934 21,144 26,810 30,916 
Neighborhood services 12,665 15,747 20,370 25,172 28,206 
Management of water resource and 
public infrastructure 
11,774 14,322 18,383 23,159 25,544 
Construction 11,328 14,112 18,482 24,161 27,529 
Hotel and catering services 11,198 13,876 17,046 20,860 23,382 
Wholesale and retail trade 10,894 15,256 21,074 29,139 33,635 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 6,884 8,207 10,847   14,356   16,717 
Average for all sectors 13,969 18,200 24,721 32,244 36,539 
Source: Compiled from Alfred M. Wu, Governing Civil Service Pay in China (Copenha-
gen: NIAS Press, 2014), pp. 167-168, Table 7.6. 
2. Red tape 
Second, red tape and cumbersome procedures contribute to corrup-
tion by providing civil servants with the excuse to extort bribes from 
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those members of the public who are willing to pay “speed money” to 
“cut” red tape and reduce delay by expediting their applications for per-
mits or licenses.299  Red tape is a serious problem in China as reflected in 
its performance on the World Bank’s ease of doing business rank from 
2007-2015, as shown in Table 13. In 2007, China was ranked 93rd among 
175 economies in terms of the ease of doing business rank. Its ease of 
doing business rank gradually improved to 79th among 183 economies in 
2011 but decreased to 96th position among 189 economies in 2014, and 
90th position in 2015. More specifically, China’s rank for starting a busi-
ness has worsened from 128th among 175 economies in 2007 to 158th
among 189 economies in 2014. However, in 2015, China’s rank for start-
ing a business improved to 128th among 189 economies. Even though the 
number of days needed to obtain a license was reduced from 367 days in 
2007 to 244.3 days in 2015, China’s rank for dealing with licenses dete-
riorated from 153rd position to 179th position during the same period. 
Similarly, China’s rank in registering property has also declined from 
21st position in 2007 to 37th position in 2015. 
Table 13: China’s Ease of Doing Business Rank, 2007-2015 
Criterion 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Ease of doing business rank 93 83 83 89 79 91 91 96 90 
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Sources: World Bank, Doing Business 2007-2015 (Washington DC, 2006-2014), various 
pages.
The problem of red tape in China is also reflected in the prolifera-
tion of administrative and operating fees, which are collected by the min-
istries, government bureaus, commissions and authorized organizations. 
There were 340 administrative and operating fees authorized in 2002 by 
the State Council, involving more than 50 ministries, bureaus and com-
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missions. The provincial governments also authorized the payment of 
several hundred fees.300 Needless to say, the collection of excessive fees 
has increased business costs, the size of government as well as corrup-
tion. The fees collected are considered by government agencies, SOEs 
and local governments as off-budget revenue (xiaojinku or “small cof-
fers”), which is “often abused and used for lavish pursuits such as pur-
chasing luxury vehicles” as well as “treating guests, purchasing presents, 
personal uses, and paying bribes.”301
3. Low probability of detection and punishment 
The third cause of corruption in China is the low probability of de-
tection and punishment for corrupt offenses. Corruption is perceived as a 
“low risk, high reward” activity in China because corrupt offenders are 
unlikely to be caught and punished.  Gerard Lemos describes the CCP as 
“remarkably tolerant and forgiving” because only two groups of corrupt 
officials are punished: “those whose greed, dishonesty and exploitation 
are so extreme and meretricious that they simply cannot be ignored and 
those whose denigration for corruption is a devious proxy for settling 
scores in a long-running factional fight.”302  With the low probability of 
being caught and prosecuted for corrupt offenses, it is not surprising that 
many officials, including senior CCP members, are willing to assume the 
low risk for engaging in corrupt practices.303
Corruption in China deteriorated during 2005-2006 because the risk 
of corrupt offenders being caught was significantly reduced due to the 
time lag between the committing of the offense and the arrest of the of-
fender increased from 20 months during 1992-1996 to 63 months during 
2005-2006.304  Among the average number of 30,000 public officials 
charged with economic crimes annually, more than 20,000 officials (66.7 
percent) were remanded to the courts for trial, but only 5,000 officials 
(16.7 percent) were imprisoned for five years or more.305 Among the 
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115,143 CCP members disciplined during 1992-2006, 44,836 (38.9 per-
cent) were warned, and 32,289 (28 percent) of them were given a serious 
warning. This means that two-thirds of those party members who were 
disciplined “got away with only a mild to serious warning that appeared 
to have no real punitive consequences.”306
What accounts for the low probability of detecting and punishing 
corrupt officials in China?  As mentioned earlier, the lack of public ac-
countability enables officials to abuse their power to further their person-
al interests without fear of detection or punishment. Furthermore, the 
CCP’s preferred option of relying on “internal resolution” instead of 
criminal prosecution to deal with its corrupt members so as to avoid em-
barrassing the CCP reinforces the perception that they would be unlikely 
to be caught or punished. Finally, the prevalence of bribery as a subcul-
ture among Chinese officials encourages them to believe that they would 
not be caught or penalized since only those officials with “bad luck” 
would be punished for their corrupt offenses.307 In sum, the combination 
of increased opportunities for corruption after 1978 and the ineffective 
anti-corruption measures mean that “engaging in corruption was a ra-
tional decision” for many Chinese officials because the costs of corrup-
tion were perceived to be much lower than the benefits.308
4. Decentralization 
The fourth cause of corruption in China is decentralization. Decen-
tralization gives the power of the central government to local govern-
ments at the county and town levels so they can implement policies. In 
addition, it grants managers of SOEs with decision-making autonomy, 
meaning there is no accountability for their decisions. The most powerful 
person at the county and township levels is the party committee secretary 
or the “first hand.”  He has the final authority in making all the major de-
cisions, including personnel decisions affecting the officials and the im-
plementation of national economic policies.309  The central government 
relies on the local party secretaries to ensure control of the county and 
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township governments. The unintended consequence of giving so much 
power to the local party secretaries is their abuse of power. This allows 
them to build  their own “independent kingdoms” by circumventing or 
disobeying the central government’s directives.310
The relationship between the central government and local govern-
ments in China depends on the issues involved. For critical issues like 
the crackdown on the Falun Gong and the single child policy, the party 
secretaries give top priority because they would be punished for any mis-
takes in policy implementation. Similarly, they also comply with meeting 
the detailed requirements for implementing those policies with specific 
quotas because their job performance is based on the attainment of such 
quotas. Spotlight issues that are brought to the attention of the political 
leaders by media exposure are usually resolved quickly by the local party 
secretaries to avoid negative consequences for themselves. By contrast, 
the local party secretaries usually ignore or pay lip service to general slo-
gans or guideline issues without specific details or performance indica-
tors because of the absence of negative consequences for non-
compliance.  As thousands of laws and regulations are passed by the 
NPC, provincial people’s congresses and local congresses, the local party 
secretaries routinely violate these laws and regulations because of their 
“abuse of power, lack of a sense of the rule of law,” “ignorance of the 
existence of these laws and regulations,” and the weak monitoring sys-
tem. The non-implementation of these laws and regulations is the “most 
problematic area” of policy implementation at the county and township 
levels in China.311
GONG Ting contends that the functions of local governments as 
state political agents and local economic principals have contributed to 
widespread corruption in China. As state agents, local governments have 
a great deal of administrative and economic discretion in implementing 
government policies, including such additional economic powers as 
“business licensing, resource distribution, administrative budgeting, local 
taxation, and trade and investment in their own localities.”312  The local 
officials’ enhanced power and discretion has increased the opportunities 
for corruption in land transfers because of their “de facto power to decide 
whether, how, to whom and at what price to lease land. Most local offi-
cials often succumb to bribery, while many of them also engage in ag-
gressive ‘rent-seeking’ activities.”313 Land corruption involving ex-
 310.  Ibid., p. 4. 
 311.  Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
 312.  Ting Gong, “Corruption and Local Governance: The Double Identity of Chinese Lo-
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 313.  Ibid., 90. 
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changes between local officials and private interests has increased and as 
many as  710,000 cases of illegal land deals were investigated from 1993 
to 2003.314  A 2014 survey of 2,293 executives in China found that the 
incidence of corruption was the highest at 41 percent in the real estate 
and construction sector and 79 percent of them reported that local offi-
cials were the main beneficiaries of corruption because they “enjoy the 
power and regulatory control to help or make life hell for businesses in 
their domains.”315
The local governments’ second role as economic principals has en-
couraged local officials to expand their financial resources because their 
performance is assessed by “local economic output, revenue growth and 
improvement in living standards” rather than compliance with the central 
government’s policies. Financial decentralization has forced local offi-
cials to use xiaojinku or “small coffers” for storing extra- and off-
budgetary funds. Xiaojinku are also known as “private coffers” and do 
not require the “strict budget compilation, examination, approval and ex-
ecution” because “they remain outside normal financial revenue and ex-
penditure.”  These coffers are also used to “embezzle, withhold and hide 
various forms of revenue and falsify costs and expenditure.” Often, their 
funds are transferred from the account books and financial statements of 
their organizations and deposited privately elsewhere.316  The money in 
the private coffers are derived from “public funds, publicly or privately, 
legally or illegally.”317
The excessive reliance on xiaojinku to keep secret funds by many 
government agencies and SOEs have given rise to rampant organization-
al corruption in China. The amount kept in these “small coffers” has in-
creased from 10 billion yuan in 1985 to 120 billion yuan in 1990.318 The 
local officials’ increased reliance on extra- and off-budgetary revenues 
has increased the opportunities for corruption because these revenues are 
not subject to oversight. The off-budgetary funds kept in xiaojinku are
“notoriously associated with the corruption of local officials,” as these 
funds are usually spent on bribery, bonuses and entertainment, including 
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the payment for lavish banquets, dancing, bowling, sauna bathing and 
vacationing in sanatoriums.319
SUN Baohou, the Auditor-in-Chief of China’s National Audit Of-
fice, has observed that the “private coffers” are used for diverse purposes 
by officials including extravagant eating and drinking, secret purposes, 
currying favor with superiors, buying official positions, entertaining 
guests and buying gifts, gambling, or keeping mistresses. Thus, these 
private coffers are viewed as the “personal purses” of the leaders and of-
ficials and used by them for multiple purposes.320 He contends that cor-
ruption in China is a chronic disease which cannot be cured because the 
“private coffers” in many public organizations provide “an endless fi-
nancial source for corrupt officials.”321
5. Guanxi and gift-giving 
Cultural practices like guanxi and the tradition of gift-giving con-
tribute to corruption in China by influencing individuals to give or re-
ceive bribes. Guanxi emphasizes the importance of “connections in order 
to secure favors in personal relations” and refers to “interpersonal link-
ages with the implication of continued exchange of favors.”322 Apart 
from promoting reciprocity in social relations, gift-giving also encour-
ages bribery among civil servants, who accept gifts provided by busi-
nessmen wishing to cut red tape or to obtain licenses or permits improp-
erly.  Guanxixue, or the “exchange of gifts, favors, and banquets,” is 
usually associated with official corruption in both official and popular 
discourse in China.323
In China, “guanxi arose as a way to defuse and subvert the elaborate 
regulations and restrictions that the state redistributive economy imposed 
on everyday life.”324 HE Qiugang of the New China News Agency has 
attributed the problem of corruption in the CCP to the criteria for promo-
tion, which are based more on guanxi than merit. Accordingly, he rec-
ommended that the CCP should curb corruption by establishing a “scien-
tific,” meritocratic cadre management system.325 His criticism is valid as 
shown by a survey of 3,000 local cadres in 16 provinces, which found 
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that nepotism and corruption were widespread and meritocracy was “of-
ten absent when selecting cadres.”326 Based on their analysis of China’s 
Central Committee members during the post-reform era, Victor Shih, 
Christopher Adolph and LIU Mingxing found that factional ties with sen-
ior party leaders, educational qualifications, and provincial revenue col-
lection were the most important factors in promotion rather than their 
performance.327
The criteria for promoting Chinese officials and granting bonuses 
are based on their age, educational level and length of service. Accord-
ingly, in order to enhance their chances for promotion, many local offi-
cials “white wash” their personal records by changing “their ages, pro-
longing their working services, and enhancing their education degrees.” 
Some officials have also deleted blemishes from their work records. 
Since China lacks a system for preventing and punishing such practices, 
faking records and deleting unwanted information are easy because “as 
long as you bribe the staff in charge of managing profiles, you can easily 
fix your record.”328
The gift-giving tradition makes it easy for Chinese officials to solic-
it bribes either directly or indirectly.329 Senior officials are usually in-
duced to get involved in corruption progressively, beginning with “less 
harmful banquets and seemingly innocent offering of gifts” to bribery 
and embezzlement after guanxi is built.330 HUANG Zongliang, a Beijing 
University professor, has attributed gift-giving to bribers attempting to 
“buy over” officials in a subtle way to enable them to ask for favors in 
the future. In his view, “festival gifts are simply bribes in disguise, alt-
hough bribers may not ask for favors immediately.”331
Since guanxi is implicated in almost all major corruption scandals 
in China, it provides “a fertile soil” for corruption to flourish and is “a 
powerful tool wielded by corrupt officials to blackmail business for their 
personal gains.”332 Gift-giving builds guanxi in the business world and 
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the powerful combination of guanxi and gift-giving constitutes an im-
portant cause of corruption in China today.  Furthermore, since political 
factions in China are based on the guanxi networks of senior officials, 
the existence of these networks undermines the anti-corruption campaign 
because “cracking down on corrupt senior government officials requires 
the Chinese government to destroy the guanxi networks that may shield 
these officials from legal punishment.”333 Thus, Xi’s anti-graft campaign 
“faces [a] core problem [because] graft is an important element in ce-
menting the loyalty of officials.”334
The preceding analysis of the five causes of corruption in China re-
inforces the main thesis of this monograph, which is that  Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign will only be effective if it addresses these causes 
instead of treating only the symptoms of corruption. William Wan has 
observed that “the license plate crackdown [on May 1, 2013] represents a 
way for him [XI Jinping] to target the visible symptoms of corruption 
without taking on its more tangled roots, such as military-related state 
enterprises.”335  Since corruption in China is the result of the low salaries 
of officials, red tape, low probability of detection and punishment of cor-
rupt offenders, discretion of local officials without accountability, and 
the cultural practices of guanxi and gift-giving, corruption cannot be 
minimized unless measures are initiated by the CCP to deal with these 
causes too. 
D. Corruption as a Weapon against Political Opponents 
In 1988, Robert Klitgaard suggested that future research on corrup-
tion should focus on studying the abuse of anti-corruption powers be-
cause anti-corruption campaigns were used “to clean up political oppo-
nents rather than to clean up corruption.”336 Joseph Fewsmith has 
observed that in China “charging one’s opponents (or their close follow-
ers) with corruption” has “become a weapon of choice for political ma-
neuver.”337 During the past two decades, China’s political leaders have 
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employed corruption as a weapon against their political enemies. Ac-
cording to HO Pin and HUANG Wenguang: 
Leadership transitions historically have been times of political 
intrigue and conspiracy, and during the past two decades a 
common and effective way to eliminate a challenger or politi-
cal opponent was to link a rival with a corruption scandal. 
President JIANG Zemin employed the trick to consolidate his 
power, as did his successor, President HU Jintao. In a one-
party state such as China, jockeying for influence is a raw real-
ity of the political system. There is nowhere else to go, so all 
fighting must be infighting.338
The regional DICs in China are very important tools used by the lo-
cal leaders to eliminate their political foes. Moreover, the CCDI enforces 
the law selectively and relies on an anti-corruption investigation as a tool 
to protect the interests of some senior CCP leaders. The CCDI’s im-
portant function is “to filter out and if necessary remove any suggestion 
of impropriety that might be harmful to the senior leadership, or attack 
opponents, or protect certain privileged persons by warning and offering 
a way out of a potential political scandal.”339 When a corruption scandal 
is exposed, the CCP leaders control the damage by identifying “who will
take the fall” and taking action against them to appease the public.340
This means that only persons who lack connections or are not politically 
significant are punished. 
The four prominent examples are the purging of CHEN Xitong by 
JIANG Zemin, CHEN Liangyu by HU Jintao, and BO Xilai and ZHOU 
Yongkang by XI Jinping.  These cases are discussed briefly below. 
1. CHEN Xitong 
To illustrate the “politicization of graft-busting” in China, Willy 
Lam indicates that the investigation of CHEN Xitong, Beijing’s Party 
Secretary, in July 1995 was orchestrated by JIANG Zemin because of the 
rivalry between his Shanghai Faction and Chen’s Beijing Faction.341
Since Chen’s Beijing Faction was supported by DENG Xiaoping, PENG 
Zhen and WAN Li, Jiang was careful and only initiated investigations 
into Chen’s corrupt activities after the suicide of Beijing’s vice-mayor, 
WANG Baosen, on April 4, 1995, but before being interviewed by the 
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CCDI investigators. Since Chen was also the head of Beijing’s Construc-
tion Program Commission, he and Wang diverted US$4 million of public 
funds towards the construction and furnishing of luxury villas “for pri-
vate use in assignations with their mistresses.”342  Wang invested US$12 
million of Beijing’s municipal government funds in the Wuxi Xinxing 
Company in Jiangsu Province because it promised investors monthly re-
turns of between five to ten percent. The company collapsed when its 
president stopped paying dividends and did not return the invested capi-
tal. The investors complained to the authorities, which then investigated 
the company’s activities and Wang’s investment.343
Since Chen was a Politburo member, the Central Committee ap-
proved the CCDI’s formal investigation of Chen on July 7 and removed 
him from both committees in September 1995.344 A multi-departmental 
team of elite agents from the police, Ministry of State Security, SPP, 
MOS and CCDI was formed to investigate Chen’s case.345 Chen became 
the highest ranking CCP member to be jailed for corruption when he was 
sentenced to 16 years imprisonment for graft involving the misappropria-
tion of 22 gifts worth 555,000 yuan and dereliction of duty on July 31, 
1998.346 Chen’s sentence was lenient compared to  more junior CCP ca-
dres who were given life sentences or the death penalty for corruption 
involving smaller amounts exceeding 100,000 yuan. However, Chen’s 
imprisonment on corruption charges was a successful attempt by his po-
litical opponents to undermine his power. His incarceration protected 
more than 170 corrupt senior CCP members from criminal punish-
ment.347 Chen’s prosecution was delayed for more than two years be-
cause the CCP was afraid that he would “expose in public the identity of 
other high-ranking corrupt officials” if he had to appear in court.348
Fewsmith viewed Chen’s ouster and investigation by Jiang as a reflection 
of “old-style politics, as one powerful politician defeated another and in-
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creased his hold on power.”349 This also enhanced Jiang’s reputation with 
the public.350
2. CHEN Liangyu 
The second example was the sacking of CHEN Liangyu, Shanghai’s
party chief, on September 25, 2006 by President HU Jintao for his al-
leged role in the misuse of 3.2 billion yuan from Shanghai’s 10 billion 
yuan pension fund. Chen was an ally of former president JIANG Zemin 
and was “a political thorn in the side” for Hu and was “often mentioned 
as a potential casualty of leadership battles.”351 Apart from showing that 
he was more serious than his predecessor in combating graft, Hu was al-
so “a past master at using the ‘anti-graft card’ as a potent weapon against 
rival CCP cliques.”  As Jiang had used fighting graft as a pretext to re-
move CHEN Xitong and LI Ruihuan, a Politburo member, it seemed that 
Hu had taken “a leaf from Jiang’s book.”352
In July 2006, ZHU Junyi, Director of Shanghai’s Social Security 
Bureau, was accused of receiving bribes and misusing 3 billion yuan 
(US$400 million) in funds. Chen’s former secretary, QIN Yu, was ar-
rested in August, and Chen himself was removed from office on Septem-
ber 24, 2006 for his involvement in the pension fund scandal. As it is ex-
tremely rare for PSC members to be prosecuted, even if there is evidence 
of their corrupt activities, Joseph Kahn argues that HU Jintao approved 
Chen’s arrest because he viewed Chen as “an obstacle to his political 
control or his policy agenda.”353
Chen’s arrest “marked a significant diminution in the influence” of 
the Shanghai Faction.354  The arrests of Chen and two members of the 
CCP Political Bureau on corruption charges in September 2006, and the 
removal from office of the mayors of Shenzhen and Chongqing in 2009, 
indicate that “anti-corruption campaigns often have as much to do with 
settling intra-party rivalries as they do with reasserting public probity.”355
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Chen was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment for bribery and abuse of 
power on April 11, 2008 by the Tianjin No. 2 Intermediate People’s 
Court.356
3. BO Xilai 
The third example of the CCP’s reliance on corruption as a political 
weapon was the sacking and detention of BO Xilai, Chongqing’s party 
chief, on March 15, 2012 by XI Jinping. Bo was removed on April 10, 
2012 from his Politburo and Central Committee positions for “serious” 
but unspecified violations of party discipline (meaning corruption).357
Garnault contends that the BO Xilai scandal has exposed “a world of 
staggering brutality, corruption, hypocrisy, and fragility” and destroying 
Bo gave Xi “a weapon with which he could taint Bo’s associates and ac-
celerate the consolidation of his power.358
Similarly, Steve Tsang, Director of Nottingham University’s China 
Policy Institute, describes the BO Xilai scandal as “a political rather than 
a legal case.” Willy Lam emphasizes the fact that it is “easy to use the 
law to attack your opponents.” Bo’s downfall as a victim of the factional 
in-fighting within the CCP in the lead-up to the 18th Party Congress in 
November 2012 reminded Lam of the “old-style backstabbing under 
Mao Zedong.”359
Bo was expelled from the CCP on September 28, 2012 and handed 
over to the SPP to face criminal charges of taking bribes, abuse of power, 
having improper sexual relationships with many women, and violating 
organizational and personnel discipline. On October 26, 2012, he lost his 
immunity against legal prosecution when he was removed from his posi-
tion as a delegate to the NPC. He was charged with bribery, embezzle-
ment and abuse of power on July 23, 2013.360  Bo pleaded not guilty to 
the three charges during his trial on August 22-26, 2013, but he was 
found guilty on all the charges and sentenced to life imprisonment on 
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September 22, 2013.361  His appeal against life imprisonment was reject-
ed by a judge of the Shandong Higher Court on October 25, 2013.362
4. ZHOU Yongkang 
The most recent case of using corruption as a weapon against a po-
litical opponent was the investigation of ZHOU Yongkang in July 2014 
and his subsequent expulsion from the CCP on December 5, 2014.363
Zhou was the Minister of Public Security from 2002-2007, a member of 
the PSC, and secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee 
of the CCP’s Central Committee from 2007-2012. When he retired from 
his official positions in November 2012,  the CCDI began investigating 
him in July 2014. 
The major reason for Zhou’s ouster was his close relationship with 
and support for BO Xilai. WANG Lijun, vice-mayor and police chief of 
Chongqing, was sacked by Bo on February 2, 2012, when he was inves-
tigated by the CCDI for corruption. Wang retaliated by sending a letter 
by express mail to the CCDI accusing Bo and his wife of bribery and 
transferring large amounts of money abroad.364  On February 6, 2012, 
Wang sought political asylum in the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu since he 
feared for his life. Since he was not granted asylum by the U.S., Wang 
left the U.S. Consulate on February 8 with the officials from the Ministry 
of State Security, sent by Zhou, to escort him to Beijing.365  Wang stood 
trial on charges of breaking the law for selfish ends, defection, abuse of 
power, and bribery and was sentenced on September 22, 2012 to 15 
years’ imprisonment.366
Wang’s attempted defection to the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu and 
his revelations of the murder of British businessman Neil Heywood by 
GU Kailai, Bo’s wife, provided ample justification for the CCP leaders 
to remove Bo before the Party Congress. At its meeting on February 12, 
2012, the PSC discussed Wang’s unsuccessful defection and his accusa-
tions against Bo. Eight of the nine PSC members at the meeting decided 
to detain Bo for investigation, with the only dissenting vote cast by Zhou 
because his son had received 4.2 billion yuan worth of government pro-
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jects from Bo. Zhou had also recommended Bo to replace him when he 
retired from the PSC in November 2012.367  At the NPC meetings in 
March 2012, Zhou was the only senior leader who interacted with Bo 
and praised him for his achievements in developing Chongqing.  Howev-
er, Zhou was prevented from leaving China that week because the CCP 
leaders had discovered that he and Bo had met five times in 2011 to con-
spire to topple the heir apparent, XI Jinping, in 2014.368  Zhou was 
charged for leaking state secrets because he had warned Bo in early 2012 
that he would be ousted.369
Box 1: US$16.05 Billion of Assets of Zhou Yongkang Confiscated by the 
Procuratorates 
The procuratorates in Beijing, Guandong, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu Province 
and Shandong Province searched Zhou Yongkang’s residences in seven differ-
ent provinces and confiscated the following assets: 
1. 326 residences in Beijing, Shenyang, Dalian, Jinan, Yantai, 
Chengdu, Nanjing, Wuxi, Suzhou, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen with a combined worth of up to 1.76 billion yuan 
(US$282.55 million). 
2. Cash in these currencies: 152.7 million yuan (US$24.5 million), 
US$275 million, 662 thousand euro, 10,000 British pounds, and 
55,000 Swiss francs. 
3. 42,850 grams of gold, silver, and gold coins. 
4. 62 cars including military jeeps and a medium-sized tourist bus. 
5. 55 paintings by famous painters with a total market value of up to 
8 million to 1 billion yuan (US$128.4 million to US$160.5 mil-
lion).
6. Five each of three different types of domestically manufactured 
guns, three each of guns from Germany, Russia, England and 
Belgium, and up to 11,000 bullets. 
7. 647 accounts and 117 foreign currency accounts belonging to 
Zhou and his relatives in 12 financial institutions and 133 differ-
ent branches were frozen; and 930 other accounts under pseudo-
nyms, fake names, and company names had 37.7336 billion yuan. 
The total amount in these accounts is $6.06 billion. 
8. Petroleum, aviation, wine, and financial securities with a total 
market value of 51.3 billion yuan (US$8.24 billion), as well as 
foreign securities and bonds worth up to 170 million yuan 
(US$27.29 million) were also seized. 
 367.  Ho and Huang, A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel, p. 211. 
 368.  Ibid., p. 212. 
 369.  “China’s ex-security czar ‘warned Bo Xilai’,” Straits Times, April 16, 2015, p. A12.  
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Based on this list, the assets confiscated from ZHOU Yongkang amounted to 
over 100 billion yuan or US$16.05 billion in value.
Source: TANG Di, “Hong Kong magazine reveals crimes and wealth of China’s
former security czar,” Epoch Times, December 26, 2014.
Box 1 provides details of the US$16.05 billion worth of assets con-
fiscated by the procuratorates from searching his residences in seven 
provinces in China after his investigation by the CCDI in July 2014. 
While the revelation of Zhou’s massive assets confirms his involvement 
in many corruption scandals, it should be emphasized that he was ousted 
by the CCP leaders not only because of his corruption scandals but more 
importantly for his conspiracy with Bo to challenge Xi’s leadership.
VII.  CONCLUSION: BUSINESS AS USUAL WHEN THE 
CAMPAIGN ENDS 
A. No-Win Situation for the CCP 
The fight against corruption is a long term task and still a serious 
task . . . I have never said one hundred coffins, one for myself. I know of 
this widespread rumor. But one hundred coffins are not enough for all 
the corrupt officials! 
Zhu Rongji, 2002370
Corruption among the elite [in China] is rampant . . . [and] is a time 
bomb ticking at the regime’s clay feet. 
 David M. Lampton, 2014371
The CCP is caught in the horns of a dilemma: it is aware that cor-
ruption is a serious problem in China which it has to resolve to ensure its 
long term survival and legitimacy. The first quotation by XI Jinping cited 
at the beginning of this monograph identifies corruption as a threat to the 
CCP’s survival if it is not curbed. However, former premier ZHU 
Rongji’s observation above on the inadequacy of 100 coffins for corrupt 
officials reflects how widespread corruption is among Chinese officials 
and David Lampton’s 2014 quotation captures accurately the urgency of 
the corruption problem in China and explains why it can no longer be ig-
nored by the CCP leaders. 
 370.  Quoted in David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, 
and Minds (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 237-238. 
 371.  Donald M. Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi 
Jinping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 227. 
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The major casualty of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is the CCP’s reputa-
tion whose image is constantly “tarnished with each case lodged against 
a high-profile official.”372 In July 2009, a popular anonymous blog on the 
Internet described corrupt officials in China pejoratively as “the new 
black-collar class” because they concealed their wrongdoing in secrecy 
thusly: 
They drive top-brand cars. They go to exclusive bars. They 
sleep on the softest beds in the best hotels. . . . They play golf, 
travel at the public expense, and enjoy a life of luxury. They 
are the newly arrived ‘black-collar class.’ Their cars are black.
Their income is hidden. Their life is hidden. Their work is hid-
den. Everything about them is hidden, like a man wearing 
black, standing in the black of night.373
The recent exposure of the corruption scandals involving BO Xilai 
and ZHOU Yongkang has eroded public confidence in the CCP.374 Con-
sequently, when corruption scandals emerge, the CCP leaders “go to 
great lengths today to convince Chinese citizens that corruption scandals 
are isolated incidents caused by a few bad eggs rather than a systemic 
problem with single-party rule.”375 However, a recent study by BAI 
Ruoyon has concluded that “the discrepancy between the CCP’s highly 
publicized anti-corruption struggles and the seemingly unstoppable esca-
lation of corruption has engendered pessimism and cynicism among the 
general population.”376
The CCP finds itself between a rock and a hard place: “if the Party 
does not get rid of corruption, it will lose the trust of the people, but if it 
does, it will have no members.”377  At the same time, however, the CCP 
leaders also know that the Party will not survive if it succeeds in mini-
mizing corruption by introducing such political reforms as the creation of 
an independent ACA and judiciary. Can the CCP curb corruption effec-
tively without causing its own demise?  The short answer is: No. 
The overthrow of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 “shook the CCP 
to its core” and led to extensive analyses of the lessons which China 
 372.  Jaime A. FlorCruz, “China corruption charges no longer shock,” CNN.com, July 31, 
2014.
 373.  Quoted in Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist 
Rulers, rev. ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2012), pp. 140-141. 
 374.  Jamil Anderlini, “China corruption trials risk erosion of party legitimacy,” Financial 
Times, September 25, 2013. 
 375.  Hart, China’s Real Leadership Question, p. 7. 
 376.  Bai, Staging Corruption, p. 211. 
 377.  Fenby, Tiger Head, Snake Tails, p. 384. 
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could learn during the next 13 years.378  These lessons were published in 
the Decision of the CCP Central Committee on Enhancing the Party’s 
Ruling Capacity, which was adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 
16th Congress of the CCP in September 2004. This important document 
identified the 52 economic, political and coercive, social and cultural, 
and international factors responsible for the Soviet Union’s collapse.379
Among the 17 political and coercive factors, corruption was surpris-
ingly not mentioned explicitly but only indirectly as the result of “poorly 
developed mechanisms to police party members for breach of disci-
pline.”380  Few analysts have highlighted the sensitive problems of cor-
ruption and party privileges for obvious reasons. However, HUANG 
Weiding identified corruption as an important cause of the Soviet Un-
ion’s collapse, which was overlooked by the CCP. To the CCP  “the 
death of the CPSU was not caused by anti-communist forces, but rather 
by corrupted members within the Party.”381 Huang warned that corrup-
tion could spread like a cancer within the CCP and threaten its survival 
by weakening its leadership and forming special interests within the par-
ty and state apparatus. Since corruption aggravates inequality and other 
social problems, and causes bureaucratic inefficiency and economic loss-
es, he believes that corruption within the CCP is the critical issue threat-
ening its survival because if it is not managed effectively, “the end of the 
party and state is likely.”382
In 1993, JIANG Changbin attributed corruption in the Soviet Union 
to the “progressive atrophy of the CPSU’s vaunted nomenklatura per-
sonnel system.” In similar vein, HE Qiugang identified these six kinds of 
special personal privileges enjoyed by CPSU members: special housing, 
special supplies, special education, special benefits for family members 
and relatives, special guards, and special expense accounts. Money poli-
tics was rampant in the CPSU, and cronyism and nepotism were prac-
tised by its leaders.383  To curb corruption within the CCP, he recom-
mended that regulations should be introduced to enhance the 
transparency of the personal assets of its leaders.  The CCP’s reliance on 
guanxi instead of merit to promote its members has also contributed to 
 378.  Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, pp. 57 and 60. 
 379.  Details of the 52 factors responsible for the Soviet Union’s collapse are provided in 
ibid., pp. 62-63, Table 4.1. The CCP identified 14 economic factors, 17 political and coercive  
factors, 15 social and cultural factors, and six international factors. 
 380.  Ibid., p. 63. 
 381.  Quoted in ibid., p. 72. 
 382.  Ibid., p. 80. 
 383.  Ibid., p. 72. 
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the development of factions and its “unscientific” process of leadership 
succession.384
As mentioned in Section II above, the CCP leaders are aware that 
corruption was responsible for the decline of the various dynasties and 
the KMT’s defeat in 1949. Hence, the important role played by corrup-
tion in contributing to the Soviet Union’s collapse has reminded the CCP 
leaders that what had happened in China in the past and in the former 
Soviet Union, can also occur in China today as corruption can lead to the 
CCP’s downfall in the future too if the problem is not resolved.
B. Addressing the Causes of Corruption 
In view of the CCP’s entrenched position in China’s political sys-
tem, it is unrealistic to expect the CCP leaders to initiate fundamental po-
litical reforms to undermine their power for the foreseeable future. In his 
May 2006 interview with a Chinese journalist, Mikhail Gorbachev 
warned his Chinese friends not to practice democratization as “it will not 
end well” because “if the party loses control over society and reform, 
there will be chaos, and that is very dangerous. Before we were prepared, 
we allowed Soviet society to greatly liberalize.”385 Learning from the 
Soviet Union’s collapse and reinforced by Gorbachev’s warning, it is un-
likely that Xi and his colleagues will introduce the necessary political re-
forms to enhance the ACAs’ effectiveness in minimizing corruption in 
China. Bearing in mind this caveat, can anything be done by the CCP to 
curb corruption in China? 
Even though Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is “both qualitatively 
and quantitatively more intense”386 than previous campaigns, it is unlike-
ly to be effective for three reasons. The most important reason why Xi’s 
campaign is unlikely to succeed is because it has dealt only with the 
symptoms of corruption but not its causes. Among the five causes of cor-
ruption in China discussed in Section VI.C above, the campaign has only 
addressed the cultural practices of guanxi and gift-giving by curbing of-
ficial extravagance on the three public expenses – cars, banquets, and 
overseas trips. This limitation of Xi’s anti-graft campaign was admitted 
by WANG Qishan, the CCDI’s secretary, in October 2014 when he indi-
cated that “it’s necessary to address the symptoms of corruption before 
 384.  Ibid., p. 80. 
 385.  Quoted in ibid., pp. 70-71. 
 386.  Merridan Varrall, “Corruption in China: The Cultural Divide,” The Interpreter, Sep-
tember 23, 2014. 
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treating its root causes.”387 However, after two and a quarter years, the 
campaign is still dealing with the symptoms of corruption without ad-
dressing the other four causes. 
Rukshana Nanayakkara, Transparency International’s Asia-Pacific 
Regional Outreach Manager, has appropriately compared China’s meth-
od of high-profile arrests and asset seizures to stripping a tree of leaves 
while leaving its roots and trunk untouched. He contends that “you can-
not fight corruption by adopting a prosecutorial approach” because “if 
you want to kill a tree, you have to take it out from the roots.” In other 
words, corruption will prevail unless its fundamental causes are ad-
dressed.388
The second limitation of Xi’s anti-graft campaign is the selective 
enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the ACAs in China. One of 
the four reasons responsible for the effectiveness of Singapore’s CPIB in
curbing corruption is the impartial enforcement of the Prevention of Cor-
ruption Act. This means that anyone found guilty of corruption in Singa-
pore is punished, regardless of the offender’s position, status, or political 
affiliation.389  By contrast, the ACAs in China do not enforce the anti-
corruption laws impartially for two reasons. 
First, as explained in Section IV.E above, the CCP enforces the an-
ti-corruption laws in China selectively because it protects its corrupt 
members by handing them over to the CCDI to discipline them internally 
within the Party instead of transferring them to the SPP for criminal in-
vestigation and prosecution. However, and this is the second reason, not 
all the corrupt officials are protected by the CCP, especially those who 
are viewed to be political opponents by the CCP leaders. XUECUN Mu-
rong contends that Xi’s crackdown on corruption is selective and is
“more of a Stalinist purge than a genuine attempt to clean up the gov-
ernment” because “investigations are run by K.G.B.-type cadres, not the 
regular judicial system.” More importantly, “the purge has mainly target-
ed specific party factions,” but those groups in Fujian and Zheijiang 
Provinces that support and are loyal to Xi appear untouched. When this 
question: “Why have no ‘big tigers’ been found in Fujian and Zhejiang?” 
was posted on the Internet, it was removed almost immediately.390
 387.  Quoted in Sun Xiaobo, “Institutionalizing anti-corruption a vital task,” Global Times, 
October 19, 2014. 
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 389.  Jon S.T. Quah, “Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau: Four Sugges-
tions for Enhancing its Effectiveness,” Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (1) (Janu-
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 390.  Murong Xuecun, “Xi’s Selective Punishment,” New York Times, January 16, 2015. 
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Similarly, Broadhurst and Wang noted in December 2013 that “the 
‘tigers’ being investigated or prosecuted thus far are also Xi’s political 
rivals, while other ‘tigers’ are so far untouched.” Since a “partial and in-
complete anti-corruption drive” may weaken the CCP’s leadership and 
legitimacy, they recommended that “in order to win public support, it is 
important that Xi’s anti-corruption drive is universal and even those from 
his own ‘string’ or guanxi network cannot escape punishment.”391
One month after the publication of Xuecun’s criticism that Xi’s an-
ti-graft campaign had not investigated any “tiger” from Fujian and Zhei-
jiang Provinces, the CCDI announced on February 17, 2015 that SI Xin-
liang, the Vice-President of the Zheijiang Provincial People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, became the first “tiger” hunted in Zheijiang 
Province.392 On March 2, 2015, the PLA Daily reported that Major Gen-
eral GUO Zhenggang, Deputy Political Commissar of the Zheijiang Pro-
vincial Military Command, was being investigated for corruption in Feb-
ruary.393  In March 2015, XU Gang, Deputy Governor of Fujian 
Province, became the first “tiger” from Fujian Province to be investigat-
ed for corruption.394 The investigation of these three “tigers” from Fujian 
and Zheijiang Provinces shows that the “tigers” in these two provinces 
are not immune from being investigated for corruption. However, since 
the number of these “tigers” is still very small – two among the 71 civil-
ian “tigers” (or 2.8 percent) and one among the 30 military “tigers” (or 
3.3 percent) – the number of “tigers” being hunted in both provinces 
should be increased substantially to dispel the public perception and crit-
icism that the corrupt “tigers” in Fujian and Zheijiang Provinces are im-
mune from investigation by the CCDI. 
Thus, contrary to the official rhetoric that the anti-corruption laws 
are enforced impartially in China, the acid test of the impartiality of Xi’s 
anti-corruption campaign is the investigation and prosecution of all “ti-
gers” and “flies,” regardless of their political affiliation or membership 
of factions within the CCP. However, it might be difficult for Xi to be 
impartial because in China “if an anti-graft campaign targets a campaign 
leader’s allies, this would damage the campaign leader’s reputation and 
make him or her lose face within the guanxi network.”395 The “litmus 
 391.  Broadhurst and Wang, “After the Bo Xilai trial,” p. 12. 
 392.  Mason Coltrane, “Another ‘big tiger’ caught in President Xi Jinping’s mission against 
corruption in China,” Yibada, February 18, 2015. 
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test” for Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is whether it “encompasses the 
families of top leaders” including Xi’s relatives and those of former 
Premier WEN Jiabao, whose wealth was revealed in 2012 respectively 
by Bloomberg and the New York Times.396
The third limitation of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which is re-
lated to the previous weakness, is the reliance of the CCP leaders on cor-
ruption as a weapon against their political opponents, as shown in the 
persecution of CHEN Xitong, CHEN Liangyu, BO Xilai and ZHOU 
Yongkang from 1995 to 2014. As shown above, these four party leaders 
were prosecuted not only for their corruption offenses, but more im-
portantly because they posed a threat to the consolidation of power of 
Presidents JIANG Zemin, HU Jintao and XI Jinping, respectively. China 
is not unique in relying on corruption as the weapon of choice against 
political enemies because other Asian countries use this method too.397
However, as long as the political leaders continue to use corruption as a 
weapon against their opponents, China will not be able to combat corrup-
tion effectively. Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy is reflected 
in its rejection of using corruption as a weapon against political oppo-
nents of the government. There, those who are found guilty of corruption 
offenses are punished according to the law, regardless of their back-
ground or political affiliation.398
In sum, XI Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is ineffective for 
three reasons: it focuses on the symptoms of corruption instead of tack-
ling its causes; the anti-corruption laws are enforced selectively; and cor-
ruption is the weapon of choice employed against the CCP’s political 
opponents. Thus, if President Xi wishes to enhance the effectiveness of 
his anti-corruption campaign, he has to initiate measures to address the 
first four causes of corruption in China, enforce the anti-corruption laws 
impartially and not selectively, and avoid using corruption as a weapon 
against his political opponents. 
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The five causes of corruption in China are analyzed in Section VI.C 
above. During its first two and a quarter years, Xi’s anti-corruption cam-
paign has so far only taken action to minimize the negative effects of 
guanxi and gift-giving by introducing the “Eight Directives” and “Six In-
junctions” to curb official extravagance, while the other four causes have 
been ignored by the campaign. 
Public sector salaries in China remain low even after the six salary 
increases from July 1997 to July 2006.399 According to Richard McGreg-
or, “the paltry official pay rates add an extra incentive for graft” since 
“the formal cash salaries of even senior officials are miserable and invar-
iably padded by illicit income.”400 The latest increase in public sector 
salaries announced on January 20, 2015 reveals that XI Jinping’s month-
ly salary has risen by 62 percent from 7,020 yuan (US$1,124) to 11,385 
yuan (US$1,823). At the other extreme, the monthly salary of the most 
junior civil servant has increased to 1,320 yuan (US$211).401  President 
Xi’s annual salary of US$21,876 pales in comparison to U.S. President 
Obama’s annual salary of US$400,000 and Singapore Prime Minister 
LEE Hsien Loong’s annual salary of S$2.2 million (US$1.76 million).402
In view of the low public sector salaries in China, a necessary but 
insufficient condition for curbing corruption is to increase these salaries 
to minimize the temptation for public officials to succumb to corruption 
and to discourage them from leaving for better paid jobs in the private 
sector. It is unrealistic to expect Chinese public officials to remain honest 
if they are paid low salaries, which are inadequate for meeting their daily 
needs. Accordingly, they should be paid decent salaries instead of “star-
vation wages” to insulate them from bribery and patronage.
However, since raising salaries is expensive, China should increase 
public sector wages more frequently as the most recent adjustment oc-
curred more than eight years after the July 2006 pay increase. Further-
more, it should be noted that raising salaries minimizes petty corruption 
by reducing the incentive for corruption among junior officials but does 
not eliminate grand corruption among senior bureaucrats and politicians. 
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Finally, increasing salaries alone is ineffective in curbing corruption in 
China if the government lacks the political will to address the other caus-
es of corruption. 
In March 2013, ZHANG Tongxi, the Board Chairman of Datong 
Coal Group in Shanxi, complained to the NPC delegates in Beijing that 
he had to contact 33 government departments and submit 147 documents 
and 205 permits to open a new coal company.403  During the same 
month, Premier LI Keqiang promised to reduce at least a third of the 
1,700 items requiring central government approval within the next five 
years.404 However, despite Li’s promise, red tape persists in China as 
confirmed by the World Bank’s Doing Business 2015. According to the 
World Bank, China requires 11 procedures and 31.4 days to start a busi-
ness and 22 procedures and 244.3 days to obtain a license405 (see Table 
12). China should enhance its efforts to minimize red tape by relying on 
e-governance in order to increase transparency and reduce corruption. 
As local officials in China regard their position as “a license to 
steal,”406  their discretion can be minimized by making them more ac-
countable for their actions.  As mentioned above, the CCDI has des-
patched 10 inspection teams across China in 2013 to investigate corrup-
tion complaints in government agencies, public organizations and 
provinces. A more cost-effective measure would be to establish an in-
spectorate in every capital city in the 22 provinces, four municipalities 
and five autonomous regions in China to ensure that local officials im-
plement the laws and regulations enacted by the central government. 
These officials are unlikely to implement these laws and regulations un-
less they are punished for non-compliance. 
However, the ACAs in China cannot implement the anti-corruption 
laws impartially unless the CCP relinquishes the protection of corrupt 
party members from investigation and criminal prosecution by the SPP 
and its reliance on corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. 
Since these two limitations on the ACAs’ effectiveness are unlikely to be 
removed by the CCP, it is unrealistic to expect any change in the selec-
tive implementation of the anti-corruption laws in the foreseeable future. 
Writing in 2003, ZOU Keyuan lamented that “once the anti-
corruption campaign ends, new corrupt activities will resurface, as 
 403.  “Why China’s corruption is so hard to clean up,” Asia Sentinel, March 20, 2013. 
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shown in every previous anti-corruption campaign.”407 He has also as-
tutely noted that “realistically, it is impossible for China to completely 
eliminate corruption.” Consequently, China can only curb an increase 
corruption because “after 20 years of reform, corruption has become 
even more severe.”408 Six years later, Roderick MacFarquhar was also 
pessimistic in his assessment: “despite repeated official campaigns, regu-
lations, and exhortations, corruption on a colossal scale has infected all 
levels of state and society.” He concluded that the status quo in China 
would remain the same because “so long as local leaders deliver taxes, 
promote development, and maintain law and order, the central leaders 
seem prepared to look the other way.”409
Following Zou and MacFarquhar, my assessment of Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign is equally pessimistic because it fails to address the 
fundamental causes of corruption in China. Unlike the many previous an-
ti-corruption campaigns initiated by the CCP during 1951 to 2011, Xi’s 
campaign has lasted for more than two years and has curbed official ex-
travagance and made corrupt officials more cautious for fear of being 
caught. However, by failing to rectify the root causes of corruption, Xi’s 
campaign “acts like a dose of ‘antibiotics’ that maintains short-term soli-
darity but also leads to resistant strains of bacteria.”410
The same argument is convincingly made by MENG Qingli, who 
describes corruption in China as “the flooding water from an overflowing 
tub on the floor in a room.” She contends that relying on the criminal jus-
tice system to detect, arrest, investigate, prosecute and convict offenders 
in China is “merely mopping up the over-flowing water” without tack-
ling the root causes of corruption.411 She concludes that “an indispensa-
ble way to stop corruption, like stopping the water flow, is to attack the 
source” by turning off the faucet. Indeed, she believes that “until the eti-
ology of the crimes is addressed, corruption will continue.”412
In other words, the change in the corrupt officials’ behavior is only 
temporary as they will revert to their wayward ways again after the cam-
paign or if they identify weaknesses or loopholes in the implementation 
of the campaign. It is unrealistic and unlikely for Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign to make a significant impact in minimizing the systemic cor-
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ruption in China so long as the campaign focuses on the symptoms in-
stead rather than the causes of corruption. Furthermore, corrupt party 
members are unlikely to change their ways if they are only disciplined 
internally by the CCDI for their corrupt offenses and if they do not op-
pose their leadership. As Kerry Brown has observed astutely: “The bot-
tom line remains the same: to be a leader in China means to be available 
to temptation and demands that are most of the time irresistible, and 
there is little sign that anything is being done to address that question.”413
While Xi’s anti-graft campaign has received public support, its 
weakness is that, unlike anti-corruption efforts in Singapore and Hong 
Kong, it does not rely on public support. An important reason for the 
success of Singapore and Hong Kong in combating corruption is the tre-
mendous public support for the CPIB and the ICAC, respectively. The 
2002 Public Perceptions Survey of the CPIB’s performance found that 70 
percent of the respondents believed that the CPIB was impartial in its in-
vestigations, 65 percent of them said that the CPIB had not abused its in-
vestigation powers, and 66 percent of them thought that the CPIB would 
keep the corruption reports received confidential.414  Similarly, the 
ICAC’s annual surveys from 2000 to 2009 confirmed that an average of 
98.9 percent of the respondents said that the ICAC deserved to be sup-
ported, an average of 71.9 percent of the respondents trusted the ICAC 
and would reveal their identity when reporting to it, and an average of 75 
percent of the respondents believed that the ICAC was an impartial law 
enforcement agency.415
Since there are no surveys on the public perceptions of the ACAs in 
China, it is not possible to ascertain the extent of public support for these 
agencies. The ACAs in China rely on these sources of information: citi-
zen reports, inspections, audits, and media exposure. CAI Yongshun in-
dicates that citizen reports or tips in “the forms of letters, visits, online 
reports, e-mails, and phone calls” are the most important source of in-
formation and accounted for 60 percent to 80 percent of the corruption 
cases investigated by the legal department.416 However, only a small pro-
portion of the tips received by the ACAs result in pursuable cases. The 
DICs and supervision bureaus investigated only 7.3 percent of the 13.9 
million reports received by them from 1996 to 2008.417  The anonymous 
tips on corruption provided by citizens are not useful as they are often 
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 415.  Ibid., p. 262. 
 416.  Cai, State and Agents in China, p. 106. 
 417.  Ibid., p. 108, Table 5.2. 
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inaccurate, speculative, vague, or based on distorted information.418
Some tips are not pursued for political reasons because the timing is in-
appropriate or other factors prevent the investigation of the reported 
problems.419  Cai contends that the selective use of tips by the ACAs in 
China casts doubt on their credibility in combating corruption.420
The Internet has become an important site for exposing corruption 
scandals in China. BAI Ruoyun found out that more than 70 scandals in-
volving local party and state officials were revealed on the Internet from 
2008-2013.421 These scandals were characterized by these four features: 
(1) citizens were responsible for exposing these scandals by sustaining 
and amplifying them and forcing the CCDI to take action; (2) focus on 
“sexual misdemeanours of officials involved in scandals [which] were 
exposed as a ‘by-product’ of investigation”; (3) political scandals involv-
ing officials were exposed by the media for making inappropriate re-
marks, “ill-calculated facial expressions, expensive wristwatches that 
they wear, and boorish manners that they put on” which were captured 
by professional, amateur, or surveillance cameras and circulated on the 
Internet; and (4) political scandals became “highly colorful and entertain-
ing events” through the wide circulation on the Internet of “sex tapes, 
lewd photos, diaries filled with details of bribery, power brokering, and 
sexual adventures, pictures of luxurious accessories, copies of itemized 
receipts detailing overseas travel costs or expensive purchases.”422
However, the media’s role in investigating corruption cases in Chi-
na is limited because it “cannot confront tigers that are still alive” and 
can only attack the carcasses of dead tigers.  This means that the media 
only provides extensive details on the scandals after the arrest of the cor-
rupt tigers.423  To prevent the political damage from corruption scandals 
involving their members from spreading, CCP leaders “decide how the 
scandal will be presented and how it ends” and “all media outlets must 
present that version of the facts.”424 As China’s major news outlets are 
also state-owned, foreign journalists have assumed the responsibility for 
exposing many corruption scandals in China.425 As mentioned above, the 
 418.  Ibid., p. 109. 
 419.  Ibid., p. 113. 
 420.  Ibid., p. 118. 
 421.  Bai, Staging Corruption, p. 219. 
 422.  Ibid., p. 220. 
 423.  Yiyi Lu, “China’s lurid tales of corruption hide a second story,” Wall Street Journal, 
October 30, 2014. 
 424.  Hart, China’s Real Leadership Question, p. 8. 
 425.  Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace 
America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2015), p. 223. 
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wealth of the relatives of President XI Jinping and former Premier WEN 
Jiabao was revealed by Bloomberg in June 2012 and the New York Times 
in October 2012 respectively.426
Thus, instead of relying on public support and the media, the CCDI 
relies on dispatching inspection teams throughout China to uncover cor-
ruption scandals. However, Leslie Holmes contends that Xi’s anti-
corruption campaign would be more effective “if it were inclusive—not
merely top down, but also unambiguously bottom-up.”427
At the 5th plenary session of the 18th CCP CCDI in Beijing on Janu-
ary 13, 2015, Xi declared that the fight against corruption was not over 
because there were still challenges ahead so the battle was not won 
yet.428  During the same meeting, he urged the CCDI officials to adopt a 
zero-tolerance approach against corruption and reiterated his commit-
ment to the anti-corruption campaign thus: 
Our determination to use strong remedies to cure [the] illness 
[of corruption] will not change. Our courage to rid our bones 
of poison will not diminish. We will also continue to hold the 
sharp sword of counter-corruption high.429
However, regardless of how long Xi sustains the anti-corruption 
campaign, the result will be the same. Corruption will persist so long as 
the campaign is enforced selectively and targets only those corrupt CCP 
members opposed to his leadership without addressing the factors re-
sponsible for the systemic corruption in China. While every country has 
corruption, “China’s was approaching a level of its own” because “for 
those at the top, the scale of temptation had reached a level unlike any-
thing ever encountered in the West.”430 As the attractive rewards of pub-
lic office in China significantly outweigh the probability of being caught 
and punished by Xi’s anti-graft campaign, the corrupt “tigers” and “flies” 
will not change their stripes or mend their ways. They are simply lying 
low to avoid being caught and will revert to type when the campaign 
ends.
By describing Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as “a fast, low-risk
way to ease anxiety and earn goodwill among the Chinese people,” LI 
Junheng contends that its emphasis on “targeting the surface” reflects “a 
 426.  See footnote 396 above. 
 427.  Leslie Holmes, “Combating Corruption in China: The Role of the State and Other 
Agencies in Comparative Perspective,” Economic and Political Studies, 3 (1) (January 2015): 
58.
 428.  “Xi says China’s anti-graft battle far from over,” Xinhuanet.com, January 13, 2015. 
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lack of political will and power to fundamentally challenge the root 
cause of corruption: a system lacking checks and balances, which is not 
likely to change as it is the safeguard of the very interest of the Party.” 
Consequently, she concludes that “the most realistic scenario for this 
pseudo house cleaning is that, far from being expelled by the CCP’s 
moral superpowers, corruption will be simply forced underground.”431
In short, corruption in China will persist as long as the rewards of 
corruption exceed the probability of being caught and punished for the 
corrupt “tigers” and “flies.” As new millionaires are minted every year in 
China, “the temptation to leverage official positions to make money is 
irresistible” and “many people seek administrative positions precisely 
because they can monetize them.”432 In its editorial on the BO Xilai 
scandal, Caixin magazine observed that Bo’s downfall confirmed the 
“need to restrict government power” because “at this stage of its devel-
opment, China offers too many temptations, and the collusion of money 
and power is commonplace.”433 Box 1 above provides the graphic details 
of the US$16.05 billion in assets which ZHOU Yongkang had accumu-
lated illegally during his 29 years in public office (1983-2012).434 While 
the anti-corruption system, which permits senior officials the right to 
“supervise themselves,” remains the same, the size of bribes has in-
creased exponentially into millions of dollars, even for junior officials.435
Table 14: Governance Indicators for China, 1996-2013 
Indicator 1996 2013 Difference 
Voice and Accountability 12.02 5.21 - 6.81 
Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism 
41.35 27.01 - 14.34 
Government Effectiveness 46.83 54.07 + 7.24 
Regulatory Quality 47.55 42.58 - 4.97 
 431.  Junheng Li, “Does China’s anti-corruption campaign spell the end of the mistress 
economy?” Forbes, February 8, 2013. 
 432.  McGregor, The Party, p. 140. 
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Rule of Law 36.36 39.81 + 3.45 
Control of Corruption 43.90 46.89 + 2.99 
Total percentile rank 228.01 215.57 - 12.44 
Source: Compiled from World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators 2013”  availa-
ble at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (accessed 11 March 
2015).
Table 14 shows that China’s level of governance according to the 
World Bank’s six indicators has declined from a total percentile rank of 
228.01 in 1996 to 215.57 in 2013. Political stability has decreased by 
14.34 percentile rank during the same period, followed by 6.81 percentile 
rank for voice and accountability, and 4.97 percentile rank for regulatory 
quality.  On the other hand, government effectiveness has risen by 7.24 
percentile rank, rule of law improved by 3.45 percentile rank, and control 
of corruption rose by 2.99 percentile rank. Since China’s level of gov-
ernance is unlikely to improve during the foreseeable future, the pro-
spects for implementing the required political and economic reforms for 
minimizing corruption are improbable. 
In the final analysis, the widespread corruption in China can only be 
minimized if the political leaders have the courage and political will to 
initiate the necessary political and economic reforms to address its root 
causes. The three “systemic flaws” of China’s political system, according 
to Shambaugh, are the CCP’s policing itself through the CCDI, its re-
fusal to allow other institutions or the media to expose corruption, and 
the judiciary’s lack of independence. Thus, “unless and until the CCP 
recognizes and addresses these three systemic flaws, corruption will con-
tinue to flourish in China.”436 However, such reforms will be difficult to 
implement because corruption is “part of the system’s DNA”437 and can-
not be eradicated without destroying the system. Consequently, corrup-
tion in China will “continue to breed like mosquitos in a swamp”438 re-
gardless of the duration of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. 
In 2008, Shambaugh cautiously indicated that it was difficult to 
predict whether the CCP could survive because of the multitude of varia-
bles and the complexity of China’s political system.439  However, he has 
boldly predicted recently that “the endgame of Chinese communist rule 
 436.  Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party, p. 166. 
 437.  Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (Lon-
don: Little Brown, 2006), p. 129. 
 438.  David Shambaugh, “Assessing China’s New Leadership one year on,” Paper present-
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ganized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, October 3-4, 
2013, p. 6.  
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has now begun” because of the “five telling indications of the regime’s 
vulnerability and the party’s systemic weaknesses.” One of these “five 
increasingly evident cracks in the regime’s control” is the systemic cor-
ruption, which “riddles the party-state and the military” and also “per-
vades Chinese society as a whole.” Even though Xi’s anti-corruption
campaign is “more sustained and severe” than previous efforts, Sham-
baugh concludes that it cannot eliminate the problem of corruption which 
is “stubbornly rooted in the single-party system, patron-client networks, 
an economy utterly lacking in transparency, a state-controlled media and 
the absence of the rule of law.”440
Let me end my analysis with this prediction: even if President Xi 
continues his anti-corruption campaign until the end of his ten-year term 
of office in November 2022, the corrupt “tigers” and “flies” will resume 
business as usual the next day as though the campaign has not occurred 
at all simply because the incentives and opportunities for corruption per-
sist in China and will prove to be irresistible to them once again. Indeed, 
without tackling the underlying causes of corruption, no anti-corruption 
campaign, no matter how long it lasts or how intensive it is, can mini-
mize the systemic corruption in China. 
 440.  David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crack-Up,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 
2015.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACA Anti-Corruption Agency 
AIC Austerity Inspection Commission 
CCDI  Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CMC  Central Military Commission 
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index 
CPIB  Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
DIC Discipline Inspection Commission 
DSC Discipline Supervision Commission 
ICAC   Independent Commission Against Corruption 
KMT Kuomintang 
MOS Ministry of Supervision 
NCPB  National Corruption Prevention Bureau 
NDMC  National Defense Mobilization Committee 
NPC National People’s Congress
PERC  Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Politburo Standing Committee 
SOE State-Owned Enterprise 
SPP Supreme People’s Procuratorate
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